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 This dissertation analyzes information, market structure, and firm pricing strate-
gies. I begin the dissertation with an analysis of the market structure of the mortgage in-
dustry. I find that the configuration of the mortgage market at its present state is vastly 
different than its historical structure. The reduction in the cost of transmitting informa-
tion has increased the collaborative environment and facilitated the dis-integration of the 
supply chain. Generally, the mortgage industry has been successful at reducing princip-
al-agent problems and minimizing asymmetric information concerns that arise in seg-
mented markets.  
 In the first essay I provide a theoretical explanation of the effect of the internet on 
market outcomes. Search models assume that the reduction in search frictions would 
lead to competitive markets. However, I argue that gatekeepers operating in online mar-
kets may create an anticompetitive effect, in addition to reducing the consumers’ search 
cost. Therefore, the conduct of the gatekeeper can cause prices in online markets to be 
higher than in retail markets and provide online firms with larger profits.  
 In the second essay “I empirically examine the role of the internet and Internet 
Comparison Search sites in reducing consumer search costs and their effects on the prices 
consumers pay for mortgages. Additionally, I expand the study to test for the effects of 
the internet on firm profits. Using a unique data set, I examine a mortgage firm’s pricing 
strategies and profits in online and retail markets, and find evidence of market power in 
online markets that do not exist in retail markets.  The presumed benefits to the consumer 
from the reduction of search cost are offset by the anticompetitive environment in online 
markets.  
 In the final essay, I examine a mortgage firm’s portfolio choice. I investigate the 
loan characteristics that affect the firm’s decision to retain mortgages as part of its own 
portfolio. I find that the decision to retain loans as a lender is driven by unobservable 
qualities. The firm does sort loans by quality, but it also prices non-brokered loans lower 
based on unobservable qualities. The sorting behavior suggests that asymmetric informa-
tion exists between the lender and the secondary market.  
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1. CHAPTER 1:  Introduction to Dissertation 
 Homeownership is often cited as an essential component of living the American 
dream. This may be attributed to several reasons, including consumer preferences, asset 
portfolio diversification,1 or as a response to the favorable tax treatment of owner-
occupied housing.2 Homeownership also comprises a large portion of consumption ex-
penditure and remains the single most important asset in homeowners’ portfolios. In the 
decade from 1996 to 2005, the homeownership rate in the United States increased from 
65.4 percent to 68.9 percent . Although the benefits of homeownership are mostly pecu-
niary in nature, researchers also have identified non-pecuniary benefits; for example,  
homeowners are more likely to develop management and problem-solving skills (Green 
and White 1997). Homeowners are also more likely to become members of nonprofit or-
ganizations, solve local problems and confer other external benefits on society. The gains 
associated with homeownership are not limited to the individual but extend to the local 
economy, as  DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) propose. Thus, homeownership is a signifi-
cant asset to the individual, his/her neighbors, and the local and national economy as a 
whole.  
 According to the US Census, the median income in 2009 was $50,303, while the 
average price of a house in the America was $282,000. The large disparity between in-
come and home the cost of a home places an enormous financial burden on the consumer 
and thus requires vibrant credit markets to help facilitate homeownership (Campbell and 
                                                 
1 For a review of literature on Portfolio choice see Carcuru,S., J. Heaton, et al. (2004). “Heterogeneity and 
Portfolio Choice: Theory and Evidence.”  
2 Poterba, J. and T. Sinai (2008). “Income Tax Provision Affecting Owner-occupied Housing: Revenue 
Costs and Incentive Effects.” NBER Working Paper 14253 
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Cocco 2003). Despite the recent collapse of financial institutions and the mortgage mar-
ket, current and prospective homeowners have access to a large number of mortgage sup-
pliers and an extensive array of mortgage programs. The mortgage market is an important 
factor in attaining the “American Dream,” and understanding the market and its compo-
nents can aid policy makers, lenders, and consumers in making homeownership a reality.  
 In this dissertation, I provide a detailed examination of the mortgage industry and 
the role of informational frictions in determining the structure and performance of the 
mortgage market. In Chapter 2, I provide an analysis of the market structure of the mort-
gage industry. This work also discusses the institutional details and the complex structure 
of the mortgage market. I find that the configuration of the mortgage market, in its 
present state, is vastly different than its historical structure due to the reduction of infor-
mation costs. The innovation of the internet and local area networks have reduced the 
cost of transmitting information and increased the ability of firms to collaborate. As a re-
sult, the mortgage market has disintegrated into specialized firms, where each firm pro-
vides a single component and collaborates with other components of the supply chain to 
produce a final product. However, the vertical disintegration of the supply chain has in-
troduced principal-agent problems. Asymmetric information concerns are present mainly 
in the broker segment of the mortgage market. The incentives and objectives of the bro-
ker are incompatible with the overall objective of the secondary market. Consequently, I 
find that more complete contracts are needed to realign the broker and market objectives. 
 Chapter 3, “A Model of Electronic Commerce in the Presence of a Gatekeeper," 
provides a theoretical explanation of the effect of the internet on market outcomes. Em-
2 
 
  
 
3 
 
pirical studies examining the effect of the internet have provided inconsistent results. 
Search models assume that the reduction in search frictions would lead to more competi-
tive markets. However, I argue that gatekeepers operating in online markets may create 
an anticompetitive effect in addition to reducing the consumers’ search cost. Therefore, 
the conduct of the gatekeeper can cause prices in online markets to be higher than in re-
tail markets and provide online firms with larger profits. When testing for the effect of 
the internet on market outcomes, it is imperative to consider the conduct of the gatekee-
per in the market and test for both prices and profits. 
 In Chapter 4, “Joint Determination of Consumer Search Behavior and Mortgage 
Pricing," I examine the role of the Internet and Internet Comparison Search sites in reduc-
ing consumer search costs, and the effects these searches have on the prices consumers 
pay for mortgages. Additionally, given the results from the third chapter, I expand the 
study to test for firm profits. Using a unique data set, I examine a mortgage firm’s pricing 
strategies in online and retail markets, and I uncover evidence of market power in online 
markets that does not exist in retail markets. To control for consumers’ selection into 
market type, I use a switching regression and find that selection into online commerce is 
random and thus the estimation method is reduced to a pooled OLS. I find that online and 
retail consumers pay the same price on average for a mortgage. After controlling for vari-
ation in marginal cost, I find that the firm earns higher profits in online markets relative 
to the retail market. In addition to reducing the cost of search to the consumer, the availa-
bility of information in online markets allows firms to observe their competitors’ pricing, 
and therefore reduces the firms’ cost of monitoring. Both consumers and firms benefit 
from the availability of information, and consequently the presumed benefits to the con-
  
 
sumer from the reduction of search costs are offset by the anticompetitive environment 
created by Internet Comparison Search sites in online markets. For some mortgage types, 
the anticompetitive effect dominates the search cost effect, which leads to higher prices in 
online markets.  
 In the final chapter, I examine a mortgage firm’s portfolio choice. Using the 
unique data set from the previous chapter, I investigate the loan characteristics that affect 
the firm’s decision to retain mortgages as part of its portfolio. Mortgage lenders can use 
their own funds to finance a mortgage or may broker the loan using other lenders’ financ-
ing. I estimate the quality differences between lender-originated loans and brokered loans 
using Oaxaca decomposition. I am able to decompose differences in prices between the 
broker and lender market into portions explained by the observed data and unexplained 
pricing, which I attribute to asymmetric information. Since the interest rate of a mortgage 
is the price of its underlying risk, any variation in price is due to risk characteristics.  
 I find that non-brokered loans are, on average, priced three basis points lower than 
brokered loans. However, the difference is statistically insignificant. By decomposing the 
difference, it is possible to disaggregate the disparity in pricing into differences due to 
observable risk characteristics and differences due to unobserved characteristics. Non-
brokered loans are priced on average 18 points lower than brokered loans because of un-
observed qualities. Consequently, it is possible to assume that the lower unexplained 
price for non-brokered loans is in response to better unobserved characteristics of lender 
originated loans.  Although this supports the presence of asymmetric information in the 
mortgage market, the unobserved difference cannot be attributed to asymmetric informa-
4 
 
  
 
tion with certainty. It is possible that the difference arises because of the lower cost of 
funds when the firm operates as a lender. Therefore, the lower prices in the lending mar-
ket may be due to the firm passing on the reduction in cost to the consumer.  
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2. CHAPTER 2: The Mortgage Process and the Vertical Disintegration of the 
Supply Chain 
2.1 Introduction to the Mortgage Market 
 The mortgage market, as it presently exists, encompasses numerous institutions 
and individuals who contribute to the provision of the financial product.  This chapter 
serves as a detailed look into the structure of the mortgage market, while providing the 
institutional details and explaining the services provided by the primary and secondary 
mortgage markets. My approach is to follow a mortgage through the stages of its “life," 
beginning with the consumer’s decision to obtain a mortgage, the origination, underwrit-
ing, the financing of the mortgage, and ending with the securitization process.  
2.1.1 The Mortgage Decision  
 The first step in this chain of activities begins with a consumer’s decision to ac-
quire a mortgage. A consumer, or borrower, in search for a mortgage is either in the 
process of purchasing a new house or refinancing an existing mortgage. Purchase con-
sumers demand funds to finance the acquisition of a new home. Alternatively, the motive 
to refinance an existing loan is more complex and may be due to the consumer’s desire to 
obtain a lower interest rate and/or adjust the term of the loan (rate or term refinance), to 
consolidate non-tax-deductible interest payments into a tax deductible mortgage, or to 
receive cash for any other purpose (cash out refinance).  
 Between 2001 and 2006, the demand for mortgages increased drastically as mar-
ket interest rates fell below their historical averages. Figure 2.1 illustrates that refinance 
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applications, measured by the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) refinance index, 
increased after market interest rates reached their lowest point in March 2003.  As market 
interest rates reached historic lows, homeowners began to refinance their existing mort-
gages and exchange them for lower rate mortgages. Given the decline in the price of 
mortgage financing, homeownership became more affordable and consequently assisted 
in the increase of homeownership rates during the same period. 
2.1.2 Consumer Search Process 
 Upon deciding to obtain a mortgage, the consumer must locate a firm to finance 
the mortgage. The vast array of possible products and seemingly differentiated programs 
make the search process complicated. Consumers searching for a mortgage find that ac-
quiring product information is exceedingly difficult (LaCour-Little 2000). Before the in-
ternet and electronic commerce, consumers searching for a mortgage product would be 
required to contact and physically visit the mortgage supplier. However, the internet has 
made the search process less onerous, and it has made information about mortgage prod-
ucts and programs more accessible to the consumer. Beginning with the consumers' 
search process, Figure 2.2 depicts the steps of a mortgage as it progresses through the 
supply chain.   
 The consumers’ search begins with the decision to either conduct retail or an elec-
tronic search process. LaCour-Little (2000) surveyed the role of technology in mortgage 
financing between 1990 and 2000 and predicted that the internet would reduce the cost of 
search to the consumer and the cost of operating a  mortgage firm. At this point in time, it 
was expected that the reduction of frictions associated with the acquisition and transmis-
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sion of information would increase the consumer surplus and reduce the price consumers 
pay for a mortgage.  
 Although the costs of search have been reduced, the empirical evidence provided 
in Chapter Four indicates that the lower search cost in online markets is not associated 
with lower prices, as theory suggests. Online search through firms like Lendingtree.com 
does not necessarily increase the competitiveness of the market and may have the oppo-
site effect of increasing the suppliers’ market power. Additionally, the availability of in-
formation about mortgage products and programs does not fully eliminate the cost of ac-
quiring a mortgage because the consumer is not aware of the underlying guidelines asso-
ciated with the products or which firm supplies the product. To become more informed of 
each firm’s guidelines and mortgage underwriting process, the consumer must submit an 
application to the mortgage supplier. This implies that the gains from the reduction of 
search costs due are not fully realized because mortgage suppliers have resisted making 
the information totally available to the consumer.       
2.2 Primary Market 
 The mortgage market has two separate but connected parts, simply referred to as 
the primary market and the secondary market. The initial phase of the loan, where con-
sumers and mortgage suppliers transact, discuss the consumer’s loan preferences, and 
eventually originate the mortgage, is recognized as the primary market. After new loans 
are originated, the primary market supplies the secondary market with the loans, which 
are in turn traded by investors.  
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2.2.1 Mortgage Choices 
 During the origination process, the consumer and originator agree on the mort-
gage product and program that best meets the consumer’s needs. Mortgage products can 
be complex, vary in many dimensions, and are supplied by different types of mortgage 
originators. In general, mortgage products are usually a variation of one of two types: 
fixed or adjustable rate mortgages (ARM). The choice of mortgage product depends on 
whether the consumer meets the required guidelines, the consumers’ preferences, and ex-
pectation of future interest rate movements. The fixed rate program has a preset interest 
rate and offers the consumer a constant monthly payment for the life of the loan. Adjust-
able rate mortgages are fixed during the introductory period, usually two to five years, 
and adjust thereafter. With a fixed rate product, the consumer can be certain that future 
payments would remain unchanged even if the market environment does change. During 
the introductory phase, the interest rate on ARM products is lower than the interest rate 
on comparable fixed rate mortgages. When deciding between fixed or adjustable rate 
mortgages, the consumer is trading off between the certainty of future payments and the 
lower initial price of ARM products during the introductory period. 
 The lender charges a lower interest rate for ARM products to compensate the con-
sumer for bearing the interest rate risk and absorbing some of the lender’s risk exposure. 
When the mortgage interest rate is fixed, the lender’s profit margin is uncertain and 
would fluctuate with the movements in the market interest rates; however, profit margins 
for ARM products are constant because the interest on the mortgage adjusts as the market 
interest rate moves. Therefore, ARM products allow the lender to transfer the risk expo-
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sure to the consumer. In contrast, when market interest rates fall, consumers with fixed 
rate mortgages would have a higher interest rate relative to the market. From the consum-
er perspective, ARM products become more attractive when future interest rates are ex-
pected to decrease as they would allow the consumer to benefit from the interest rate 
movement. Fixed rate mortgages are preferred when market interest rates are expected to 
increase; historically consumers’ mortgage choices have been in response to the expecta-
tion of market interest rate movements. However, during the recent period of low interest 
rates, consumers shifted toward ARM products, while historic trends would suggest an 
increase in the demand for fixed rate mortgages. The recent shift towards ARM products 
is due to the product’s low initial interest rate and consequently its affordability.3  
 
 The Case-Shiller home price index, a measure of national home prices, increased 
dramatically between 2001 and 2007, as indicated in Figure 2.3. The unprecedented ap-
preciation of home prices resulted in an increase in consumer demand for mortgage refi-
nancing and an increase in mortgage loan amounts. Due to the drastic appreciation rates, 
homeowners experienced an increase in their net worth and began to refinance their 
mortgages to extract the available equity from their homes and consequently realize the 
gains. Alternatively, consumers purchasing new homes were required to either provide a 
larger down payment or demand larger loan amounts to finance the purchase of more ex-
pensive homes. Yet, growth in income was deficient in comparison to home appreciation 
rates, which further exacerbated growth of loan amounts during 2001 to 2006. Two im-
portant measures of home affordability, which lenders examine during the loan under-
                                                 
3 Campbell et al. 2003 suggest that if consumers are risk-averse, fixed rate mortgage products are favorable 
for individuals with large mortgages, volatile income, high default cost, or immobile homeowners. 
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writing process, are the housing payment-to-income ratio and the total debt-to-income 
ratio. The payment-to-income ratio is a measure of the fraction of the gross income allo-
cated to housing, and the debt-to-income ratio measures the amount of income allocated 
to all liabilities. Since loan amounts were increasing faster than income, both measures of 
affordability increased. To minimize the required monthly payment, homeowners shifted 
towards products with lower interest rates. ARM products offered consumers lower initial 
payments compared to fixed mortgages, but in doing so, the consumer absorbed the inter-
est rate risk. Although historic trends suggested that consumers preferred to lock in low 
rates when market interest rates were low, the unprecedented home appreciation made 
ARM products more appealing.   
 Follain (1990) provides a comprehensive description of the mortgage choice deci-
sion and details several factors that consumers consider when comparing mortgage prod-
ucts. In addition to choosing the mortgage type, analogous to a firm’s decision of the debt 
to equity level to maintain, a borrower must decide on the loan-to-value ratio. As the 
loan-to-value ratio increases, the amount of equity the consumer has invested in the prop-
erty decreases. From a lender’s perspective, the amount invested by the consumer serves 
as a proxy for consumer’s attachment to the property. Consumers without an investment 
in the property are more likely to walk away or default on the loan.4 As the loan-to-value 
ratio increases, the expected probability of default increases. The choices made by the 
consumers are important to the lender because the lender’s central objective is to attempt 
to identify the likelihood a consumer will successfully repay the mortgage. 
                                                 
4 The literature on strategic default suggests that consumers will only default on a mortgage when they have 
negative equity (when the value of a home is less than the outstanding mortgage). Other researchers have 
argued that equity and default are negatively correlated, even if equity is positive. See Order, R. V. (2000). 
"The U.S Mortgage Market: A Model of Dueling Charters." Journal of Housing Research 11(2): 233-256. 
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2.2.2 Mortgage Originators  
 During the search for a mortgage product, consumers are also implicitly choosing 
the mortgage originator. Before the collapse of the Savings and Loans Industry in 1989, 
options for mortgage suppliers were limited and centralized. Borrowers' searches led 
them to their depository institution, such as a Savings and Loans or community bank. The 
depository institutions financed mortgages based on available deposits. In the customary 
process, the mortgage provider was responsible for originating the loan, underwriting the 
risk, financing the loan, and finally servicing the loan until its termination.5 In the tradi-
tional structure, the mortgage originator retains the loan in its own asset portfolio and is 
responsible for it throughout the life of the loan.  
 Contrary to its initial structure, the current state of the mortgage market involves 
many specialized firms which have vertically dis-integrated and unbundled the services 
provided by the thrifts. Advancements in the secondary market have influenced the struc-
tural evolution of the mortgage market, but have done so in conjunction with or in re-
sponse to regulatory changes in the banking industry. Before the 1990s, thrifts managed 
the entire mortgage process mainly due to the comparative advantage acquired through 
regulation. As a commitment towards increasing homeownership rates, government regu-
lation reduced capital requirements and provided lower tax rates for firms investing in 
mortgages. Moreover, beneficial treatment of thrifts reduced their cost of borrowing from 
depositors (Regulation Q), and gave them a reduction in depository insurance premiums 
(Follain and Zorn 1990). 
                                                 
5 Termination refers to default, prepayment, or maturity of the loan.  
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 In 1989, the collapse of Savings and Loans ushered in the Financial Institutions 
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA). The Act eliminated the policies that 
favored thrifts and led to the centralization of the mortgage process. With equal treat-
ment, new firms began to compete with traditional mortgage originators. Due to econo-
mies of scope, advances in technology, and the securitization market,6 the unbundling of 
mortgage services soon followed. The vertical dis-integration of the mortgage process has 
created an assortment of firms that specialize in loan origination, underwriting, financing, 
or loan servicing.   
 Mortgage originators typically fall into one of two comprehensive categories; they 
are classified as lenders or third party originators (TPOs). The distinction between the 
two groups is based on the mortgage originators’ services, intensity of specialization, and 
the degree of dependence on secondary market financing to supply mortgages.   
 Lenders are firms that originate loans, and either sell their loans to the secondary 
market or maintain them in their own portfolio. The lender classification is further segre-
gated into portfolio lenders, mortgage bankers, and wholesale lenders. In addition to ori-
ginating the loan, a portfolio lender funds its own loans, services the loans, and most im-
portantly maintains the loan in its own portfolio. Their production model most resembles 
the thrifts’ mortgage process. Usually they are depository institutions, and therefore the 
financing of new mortgages is achieved through consumer deposit. This allows the port-
folio lender to provide the consumer with unique loan programs and often advertise spe-
cial loan products that do not conform to the guidelines imposed by the secondary mar-
ket. In the case that portfolio lenders need to liquidate their unique loans, they must ser-
                                                 
6 Securitization process is discussed in further detail in the next section.  
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vice the loan for a year before it can be eligible for sale into the secondary market.  Banks 
and other depository institutions, like Washington Mutual, are considered portfolio lend-
ers. 
 Firms that finance the loan and immediately sell it to the secondary market are 
referred to as mortgage bankers. Like portfolio lenders, mortgage bankers may also be 
depository institutions, making dissimilarity between mortgage bankers and portfolio 
lenders less apparent. The distinction between the two types of operations is that mort-
gage bankers usually unbundle mortgage servicing rights to other firms. Additionally, 
because mortgage bankers immediately sell their loans to the secondary market, they ab-
ide by the secondary market guidelines. In the case that a mortgage banker does not col-
lect deposits, mortgages are financed through a warehouse line of credit. For firms oper-
ating by means of credit lines, it is imperative for them to remain liquid and thus sell 
loans instantaneously to the secondary market to facilitate the origination of new loans. 
Countrywide Financial and Wells Fargo Home Loans operate as mortgage bankers; how-
ever, both Countrywide Financial and Wells Fargo Home Loans also boast wholesale 
lending divisions. 
 Wholesale lenders are mortgage bankers or portfolio lenders that, in addition to 
having their own retail division, obtain some of their business through third party origina-
tors (TPOs), specifically mortgage brokers. The difference between the lender classifica-
tions is a function of who provides the origination services and the level of integration 
between the lender and the originator. When the origination and underwriting services are 
vertically integrated, the firm operates as a mortgage banker or a portfolio lender. On the 
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other hand, wholesale lenders disintegrate the origination and underwriting process and 
allow specialized independent brokers to originate the loan. This provides the lender with 
the ability to specialize in underwriting and mortgage financing services. This in turn re-
duces their operating costs by allowing them to divest from the origination process. Theo-
retically, a firm can operate solely as a wholesale lender, in which case it is a buyer of 
origination services and specializes in underwriting loans. 
 The wholesale lender maintains ownership over the underwriting services, financ-
ing the loan and sale of the loan to the secondary market. As part of the unbundling 
process in the mortgage industry, third party originators have specialized in the mortgage 
origination services. The independent broker assists the consumer in finding the product 
that meets their preferences by accessing the products and guidelines of a multitude of 
wholesale lenders. The existence and purpose of the independent broker is to reduce the 
transaction cost incurred by the consumer due to searching for a product that meets their 
needs. In recent years, mortgage brokers have become a popular method of consumer 
search. They have seen their market share increase from 52% in 1997 (Lamalfa 1998 ) to 
68% of the origination market in 2004.7  
 The increase in mortgage broker utilization would suggest that there are benefits 
to the consumer for choosing a mortgage broker. According to LaMalfa (1998 ), the pop-
ularity of mortgage brokers is due to their lower cost structure and incentive-based pay. 
The performance pay attracts the best and most ambitious loan officers. Although loan 
officers in the mortgage brokers system are agents to the consumer, they do not have a 
                                                 
7http://www.mortgagebankers.org/files/Bulletin/InternalResource/44664_September2006-
ResidentialMortgageOriginationChannels.pdf  
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fiduciary responsibility to the borrower. This is further highlighted by the conflict of in-
terest in the broker’s sources of revenue. Brokers can obtain income through origination 
fees (commission) collected from the consumer for the service of matching them with a 
lender; they can also obtain income through yield spread premiums (YSP) paid by whole-
sale lender to the broker. The yield spread premium is created by the lender as an incen-
tive to the broker to charge an interest rate higher than required by the minimum guide-
lines.  
 Wholesale lenders can further unbundle their services by relinquishing both origi-
nation and underwriting services to the TPO. The firm providing origination and under-
writing services operates as a correspondent for the wholesale lender.  In this case, the 
correspondent8 is responsible for originating the loan and underwriting it so that it meets 
the wholesale lender’s guidelines. The wholesale lender specializes in financing the 
mortgage and buys the asset immediately from the correspondent at the closing of the 
loan. Thereafter, the wholesale lender can either retain the loan in its own portfolio (port-
folio lender) or sell it to the secondary market (mortgage banker).  
 The categorical definitions for loan originators are not exclusive and firms can 
operate under different types. Firms operating in the market can easily transition within 
the lender types, continuously altering which mortgage services to make or buy in re-
sponse to market conditions. Traditionally, firms have remained separated within the 
larger classification subsets, either operating as a lender or third party originator. Howev-
er, recently a new firm model has developed which allows a firm to operate across the 
                                                 
8 Also referred to as table funders. 
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lender and broker boundary. The new class of firm operates as a hybrid; it can choose to 
operate either as a broker (TPO) or as a mortgage banker.  
 The development of the hybrid lender is a result of the increased liquidity in the 
secondary market. Lenders previously incurred a high cost of establishing the source of 
funds to finance mortgages. The increase in demand for mortgage securities in the sec-
ondary market increased the supply of mortgage loans, which led to a reduction in lend-
ing standards (Dell'Ariccia, Igan et al. 2009). The decline in the cost of lending allowed 
existing TPOs to develop mortgage banking divisions and consequently merge portions 
of the process that were previously unbundled. Unlike lenders, the hybrid firm can be a 
lender while also retaining the option to act as a broker or a correspondent. The possibili-
ty of operating as either a lender or a broker raises questions about the conditions under 
which the firm chooses one form of operation over the other. A discussion of these condi-
tions is the topic of Chapter Five.  
 The extensive assortment of lenders and originators is the byproduct of the specia-
lization that occurred due to the increased ability of the market to coordinate the flow of 
information between the firms. The advent of the internet and local area networks re-
duced the frictions and transaction cost in the market (LaCour-Little 2000). The mortgage 
broker model of operations is only possible because loan officers are able to access and 
survey wholesale lenders pricing effortlessly and in real time. The ability of a broker to 
coordinate with the lender facilitates the vertical dis-integration of the process. Lenders 
are able to specialize in the financing of mortgages while allowing other firms to special-
ize in origination services. Although the reduction of market frictions was initiated by 
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changes in the regulatory environment, it was enhanced by the growth of the secondary 
market and the reduction in the cost of information. The ability to dis-integrate the vertic-
al chain of supply within the primary market would not be possible if firms could not 
transact and share information readily (Jacobides 2003).   
2.3 Secondary Market 
 Although the market for mortgage suppliers is large and segmented, the main ob-
jective of the mortgage process is to connect the consumers with the end investor. The 
lender is simply an intermediary in the process that funds mortgages using financing from 
the credit markets. Therefore, they merely serve as a link between demanders of funds 
and the suppliers of capital in the secondary market.  With the exception of the portfolio 
lender, which retains the mortgage on its own balance sheet, all other lenders utilize sec-
ondary market financing to fund their operations.  
 The secondary market is structured so that it increases liquidity in the housing 
markets and reduces the lender’s risk exposure. The presence of investors willing to fund 
mortgage loans alleviates the need for lenders to collect deposits to finance their loans. 
Moreover, for depository institutions, the secondary market reduces the risk associated 
with funding long term mortgages via short term deposits. A vibrant secondary market 
reduces the capital requirements necessary to start up a lending firm. The establishment 
of the secondary market has reduced the barriers to entry, and thus increased competition 
in the mortgage lending market.  
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2.3.1 Securitizers 
 The secondary market has existed since the establishment of the Federal National 
Mortgage Association (FNMA , or Fannie Mae) in 1938. Although it has existed since 
then, the role of the secondary market was minimal at its inception. Fannie Mae’s prima-
ry responsibility was to create a market for loans insured by the Federal Housing Admin-
istration (FHA) and the Veterans Administration (VA).  This allowed mortgage lenders to 
increase their origination of FHA and VA loans because they knew the mortgages would 
be purchased by Fannie Mae. In 1968, Fannie Mae’s charter was adjusted to allow it to 
purchase conventional loans and FHA/VA loans became the responsibility of the Gov-
ernment National Mortgage Associations (GNMA or Ginnie Mae). Additionally, in 1970 
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC or Freddie Mac) was established 
to purchase assets from Savings and Loans.  
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are chartered as Government Sponsored Enterprises 
(GSE), which implies that although they are not government owned, they receive prefe-
rential treatment (McDonald and Thornton 2008). They are exempt from state and local 
taxes and have access to a $2.25 billion line of credit from the Treasury.  This preferential 
treatment is due to the alignment of the GSE's mission with the government’s objective 
of making homeownership more attainable.  The GSEs approach to making homeowner-
ship more accessible integrates the mortgage markets with the capital markets.  
 As of 2006, the two GSEs had an outstanding debt of $4.47 trillion, almost equal 
to the $4.84 trillion of publicly held government debt (Poole 2007).  Furthermore, their 
role in the mortgage securitization process has increased from 8% in  1981 to 50% of all 
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originated loans in 2003 (Jaffee 2010). Their main activity is to pool mortgage credit and 
create mortgage backed securities (MBS), which in turn are sold to institutional and non-
institutional investors. The securitization process allows the lender to transfer the credit 
risk to the GSE, while the GSE receives the stream of mortgage payments and a guaran-
teed fee (for insuring the mortgage).  
 During the growth of the subprime segment of the mortgage market from 2005 to 
2007, the market share of loans securitized by the GSEs declined. As part of the charter, 
GSEs have limits on the credit risk they can incur and the types of loans eligible for pur-
chase. Loans which meet the GSE securitization guidelines are commonly referred to as 
conforming or agency loans. As part of the securitization process, the GSEs insure the 
mortgage backed securities investor against default. The agencies treat a mortgage default 
as prepayment of the loan, and therefore they are responsible for paying the investors if 
the loan were to default. To maintain an optimal level of credit risk, the GSEs restrict the 
loan-to-value ratio to 80% and a maximum loan amount (adjusted annually for inflation 
and housing appreciation).9  Loans above the 80% loan-to-value threshold are still avail-
able for GSE purchase if the consumer obtains private mortgage insurance (PMI) to cover 
the amount exceeding 80%.  
 Loans that do not meet GSE criteria are nonconforming (subprime) to the guide-
lines and thus are sold to private label firms. Lehman Brothers10, Salomon Brothers, 
General Electric, and insurance firms are some of the Securitizers in the private label 
                                                 
9 2009 conforming loan limit was $417,000 for a single family home, an increase of 65% from 2000. 
Alaska, Hawaii, Virgin Islands and Guam are considered high cost areas. The conforming limit in high cost 
areas is 50% higher.  
10 On September 15th 2008, Lehman Brothers Holding Inc. filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy. 
http://www.lehman.com/press/pdf_2008/091508_lbhi_chapter11_announce.pdf  
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market. These firms’ services create a secondary market for loans that are not covered 
due to the guidelines imposed by the GSEs. With the exception of the provision of insur-
ance, the private label securitization procedure is similar to the GSE’s.  
2.3.2 Securitization Process  
 During the process of a loan, it is originated, underwritten, funded, and eventually 
sold to the GSE. If the loan does not meet the conforming guidelines, it is sold to private 
label firms.  The GSEs securitize loans through either the swap program or the cash pro-
gram. The most common form of securitization is the swap program, where mortgage 
backed securities are traded to the lender for a pool of mortgages. The value of the mort-
gage backed security is net of guarantee fees paid to the agency and the cost of servicing 
(Ambrose, LaCour-Little et al. 2005). The exchange provides the lending firm with a liq-
uid asset that can either be retained by the firm or sold to investors. In contrast, the cash 
program requires that the agencies combine smaller pools of loans purchased from mul-
tiple lenders and issue securities backed by the entire pool. Because the lender is paid in 
cash, it enables the company to realize profits from the sale in the current period. 
 Private label firms are at a competitive disadvantage to the GSE because their 
loans are not insured and do not have the implicit backing of the government. Conse-
quently, mortgage backed securities issued by private label firms are riskier and usually 
priced 40 basis points11 higher than comparable GSE securities (Passmore, Sparks et al. 
2002). However, this estimate is misleading because in addition to not being insured, pri-
vate label securities include riskier loans to begin with.  
                                                 
11 A basis point is equivalent to 1/100th of a percent. A 40 basis point difference is equal to 0.40% 
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 Private label firms have three methods to reallocate and reduce the risk exposure 
to the final investor. First, they can separate the pool into tranches of senior and subordi-
nate classes. The highest rated tranches (senior) usually have the least amount of risk ex-
posure, but receive the lowest yield. Alternatively, the lowest rated tranche bears most of 
the credit risk and has the highest yield. The lowest tranche is the least desirable, usually 
described as toxic waste, and is difficult to sell. Consequently, toxic waste is mostly re-
tained by the issuer, sold to unregulated institutions, or repackaged into collateralized 
mortgage obligations. Investors of mortgage backed securities or collateralized mortgage 
obligations do not have information about the risk of individual loans in the pool of 
mortgages. Investors acquire information about risk of the asset through the seniority of 
the tranche.12   
 The second method of risk mitigation is the overcollateralization of the mortgage 
security.  In this case, each security is backed by mortgages whose values exceed the val-
ue of the securities. If a single loan defaults, the payment stream to the investor remains 
current. Nevertheless, the private firms will continue to incur some of the credit risk be-
cause a portion of the mortgages in the pool are unsold. Finally, the private label firm can 
purchase insurance from banks, insurance firms or the GSEs against the risk of default. 
Furthermore, derivative securities, such as collateralized mortgage obligations, were also 
established to further diversify the risk of default. Collateralized mortgage obligations 
pool the tranches of several mortgage backed securities to reallocate and diversify the 
tranches to create new securities.  
                                                 
12 According to Downing et al (2005), the GSEs purposefully restrict information about the underlying as-
sets to eliminate the lemons problem from the secondary market.  
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 The development of the GSE and private label securitization has increased li-
quidity in the mortgage market. In addition to the liquidity gains, the involvement of the 
secondary market has also contributed to the segmentation of the upstream process. It has 
allowed origination services to be separated from the financing process; also, it has  per-
mitted the separation of loan servicing activities from the origination process. It is no 
longer essential for the lender to collect the monthly payments after the sale of the loan. 
Most lenders have divested loan servicing from their operations and sold the rights to 
other firms that specialize in collecting payments from the borrower. In return, the servic-
ing firms receive the servicing fee, usually 25 basis points of the principle loan amount 
(LaCour-Little and Chun 1999). 
 The largest contribution of the secondary market to the mortgage industry is that 
it has standardized mortgage programs and made the mortgage process more transpa-
rent13. Lenders, originators, and underwriters processing mortgages can access the sec-
ondary market’s publicly available guidelines. The transparency of the guidelines elimi-
nates asset-specificity issues and reduces the potential of the holdup problem throughout 
the supply chain (Williamson 1981). Additionally, both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
have further reduced the transaction cost to the lender by reducing the frictions in acquir-
ing a loan purchase approval. Fannie Mae’s Desktop Underwriter (DU) and Freddie 
Mac's Loan Prospector (LP) were developed to automate the credit scoring and decision 
making process. Lenders and originators can input the loan information in either the DU 
or LP software and gain immediate response from the GSEs. After the inception of the 
                                                 
13 There are variations across states in mortgage documentation and programs due to variations in state 
mortgage regulation.  
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DU and LP programs in 1995, non-agency Securitizers provided their own automated 
credit scoring programs.  
 The automated underwriting system provides a risk rating for each loan, details 
the minimum requirements under which the Securitizers would purchase the loan from 
the lender, and sets the minimum price to accept for the risk (interest rate). For GSE sys-
tems the possible risk ratings are “accept,” “reject,” and “caution.” Accept means that the 
loan will be purchased by the GSE pending verification of the information entered in the 
system. If the loan is marginally unacceptable and requires “quality redeeming” features, 
the loan receives a “refer risk” rating. In this case the lender needs to provide more in-
formation to justify financing the mortgage.14 A loan with a caution rating will not be 
eligible for purchase by the GSEs. For non-agency loans, the applicable risk ratings are 
either eligible or ineligible for purchase.  
 The automated systems reduce the uncertainty associated with the mortgage 
process. Firms allocating resources to a loan are assured that their investment will be re-
warded. Mortgage originators can focus on originating loans without concern about the 
financing, and lenders can finance the loan knowing that, if all criteria are met, the sec-
ondary market will purchase the loan. These innovations in the secondary market have 
drastically impacted the structure of the mortgage market.  
 The interaction of the growth of the secondary market with the technological 
evaluation has allowed the disintegration of the mortgage process and has facilitated the 
unbundling of services. A segmented market is able to specialize in the provision of a 
                                                 
14 Information about the consumer’s wealth accumulation or other assets may be required.  
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service and coordinate their actions when trading with firms down the supply chain. The 
market today is vastly different than the centralized mortgage market that existed pre-
viously. 
2.4 Asymmetric Information in the Mortgage Market 
 Although technology has increased the flow of information, it does not guarantee 
that the information is either perfect or complete. The recent near-collapse of the mort-
gage market has increased skepticism about the quality of information transmitted in the 
mortgage market.  The improved coordination and transparency between the market par-
ticipants may have reduced the holdup problem, yet asymmetric information issues still 
exist and play a role in market transactions and the industry performance.    
 The segments of the supply chain are separated by the boundaries of adjoining 
firms. Although the coordination of firms across the boundaries has allowed them to spe-
cialize, there are concerns that information is not transmitted completely. Additionally, 
firms do not confront a common incentive structure, which usually leads to principal-
agent problems. The segmentation and unbundling of the mortgage process increases the 
probability that a single firm does not distribute all available information to other partici-
pants in process.   
2.4.1 Consumer-Lender Relationship. 
 The first relationship that may exhibit asymmetrical information is at the under-
writing phase; it is the relationship between the consumer and lender. Once a consumer 
and lender have agreed on the mortgage choice, the lender underwrites the risk associated 
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with the loan and confirms that it meets the secondary market guidelines. To price the 
risk of the loan, during the underwriting process the lender combines all loan information 
to generate an application score (the automated system),15 or origination score (Avery et 
al, 2000). In addition, the underwriter’s objective is to verify that the information pro-
vided by the consumer is sufficient and acceptable to the secondary market. The origina-
tion score is assumed to be a more objective measure and provides the lender with a me-
thodical approach to measure and price the risk of default. Lenders put forth a tremend-
ous amount of effort to accurately measure the consumer's default likelihood and to en-
sure that the loan meets the guidelines. Consequently, lenders base their lending decisions 
on observable information provided by the consumer. The quality of the consumer is said 
to be high if the combined attributes of the loan suggest that the consumer is less likely to 
default. The borrower can assist the lender in assessing the likelihood of default and re-
duce uncertainty by making available complete information beyond the minimum amount 
required. The additional information is usually unobserved, but valuable to the lender and 
the secondary market. The unobserved quality measures can be in the form of wealth in-
formation, likelihood of continued employment, and debt information not appearing on 
the credit report.  
 The origination score is the combined score from the 3-C’s. The capacity to pay 
the loan is measured by the debt-to-income ratio and employment history of the consum-
er. The value of the collateral is a function of both the value of the home and the loan-to-
value ratio. Finally, the borrower’s credit worthiness is signaled by the payment behavior 
on current and past credit, which is provided by the information in the credit report. 
                                                 
15 Accept, reject, caution for the GSE loans, or eligible and ineligible for Private Label. 
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These three factors provide the minimum information needed for the firm to successfully 
decide if it will fund the loan through GSE or private label financing.  
 While the consumer knows his/her true quality, the lender is attempting to esti-
mate the consumer’s likelihood of default based on the information provided. Thus, the 
relationship between the consumer and the lender exhibits asymmetric information. Spe-
cifically, the consumer has more information about his/her likelihood of continued em-
ployment, while the lender has to approximate the borrower’s future employment based 
on historical employment stability. Most lenders require that the consumer provide two 
years of continuous employment history, usually supported by W-2 documentation. Addi-
tionally, the consumer credit report does not provide the true measure of credit history or 
current outstanding debt. The credit report only includes information that is reported to 
the repository firms; any private debts and payment history on monthly utilities are ex-
cluded. The perceived default likelihood would decrease as the borrower’s net worth in-
creases; however, firms do not gain information about the consumer’s savings and re-
tirement accounts unless the consumer volunteers the information or is explicitly required 
by the automated system’s conditional approval.  
 In the same context, if the consumer owns any other real estate, the lender will 
become informed only if there is a mortgage associated with the property and it appears 
on the credit report. If the consumer owns an investment property or a second home and 
has either paid the mortgage in full or purchased the property using their own assets, the 
lender will not observe any of the information. The unobserved information has the po-
tential of adjusting the quality of the loan, but is usually omitted because the consumer is 
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unwilling to furnish the information or is unaware that the information is useful to the 
lender; also, this information is not required by the automated approval system. 
2.4.2 Originator-Lender Relationship 
 Another instance where information may not be completely transmitted occurs 
between the originator and lender. This is especially the case when origination services 
are provided by a third party originator, and the objectives of the originator and lender do 
not align. The originator’s service is to match the consumer with the lender, whereas the 
lender’s objective is to finance a loan that will be of high quality.  
 The lender’s reputation is at risk if it provides the secondary market with loans 
that default or prepay too frequently. If the lender supplies poor quality loans, the sec-
ondary market may restrict future purchases on recourse basis.  The reputational threat 
would require due diligence by the lender to ensure that the probability of default or pre-
payment is minimized.   
 The originator does not absorb the cost of default, and would not be as meticulous 
about gathering complete information from the consumer. Moreover, if the originator has 
information that reduces the quality of the loan but is not required by secondary market 
guidelines, the originator is not required to furnish the information. The originator’s ob-
jective is to process the loan and receive the commission and yield spread premium for 
their service. Neither revenue source is conditional on the loan performance.  
 The principal-agent problem reduces the quality of information that flows from 
originator to lender. If a loan receives an “accept” risk grading, then the originator does 
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not need to supply any additional documentation, even if it is available. This is especially 
important when the additional information may change the risk rating of the loan. For 
instance, if a borrower supplies the originator with a 401k statement to verify net worth 
but the loan guidelines do not require the verification of assets, the broker would not be 
inclined to submit that information to the lender. However, 401k statements can reveal 
information about the consumer’s liquidity and can adjust the quality of the loan. A con-
sumer who has taken a loan from the employer against the value of the 401k account 
would represent a higher risk than a consumer without a loan. To accurately measure the 
risk of default, it would be beneficial to the lender to have the 401k statement.  
 Studies examining the performance of loans originated by third party originators 
have found evidence of the presence of asymmetric information in the relationship be-
tween originator and lender.  Alexander et al (2002) propose that the principal-agent 
problem evolves between TPO and lender because TPOs are compensated for the origina-
tion of the loan but do not confront the cost of poor loan performance. The empirical re-
sults confirm that loans originated by TPOs are more likely to default in comparison to 
loans originated by the lender. The higher cost of default by TPO loans was initially ab-
sorbed by the Securitizers. Since TPO and lender-originated loans were equally priced, 
market inefficiency resulted. To correct the market inefficiency and to reflect their higher 
risk of default, Securitizers eventually increased the cost of funding TPO loans. 
 LaCour-Little et al (1999) also examine the principal-agent problems that may 
transpire between the TPO and Lender. However, they study the differences in early re-
payment between TPO and lender loans. Prepayment is costly to the investor because it 
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alters the schedule of payments to the mortgage backed security. The probability of pre-
payment always exists, but it increases when market interest rates decrease, as refinanc-
ing becomes more favorable. Therefore, risk of prepayment is already priced by the sec-
ondary market; however, the authors find that loans originated by TPOs are more likely 
to prepay after controlling for other factors of termination risk. They associate the higher 
probabilities of prepayment to the incentive for TPOs to “churn” the consumer.  
 The contractual agreement between TPO and lender restricts the TPO from soli-
citing the consumer after the loan is closed. However, broker compensation is based upon 
the number of transactions and the volume of business the broker produces, and herein 
lies the principal-agent problem. The contract is too costly to monitor because the con-
sumer is free to prepay the loan at anytime, and the lender does not observe the reasons 
for prepayment. Consequently, mortgage brokers are not bound by the contract and solicit 
consumers to refinance as often as possible.   
 There is evidence that the principal-agent problem restricts the amount of infor-
mation transmitted from the originator to the lender and eventually to the secondary mar-
ket. The efficiency gains acquired from specialization are mitigated due to the conflict of 
interest and the lack of accountability by originators.  
2.4.3 Lender-Secondary Market Relationship 
 The relationship between lender and the secondary market is more defined, and 
asymmetric information concerns are minimized due to the contracts and incentive me-
chanisms. The ability of the secondary market to impose restriction on lenders ensures 
30 
 
  
 
that lenders are held accountable for their loan quality. The reputation effect maintains 
coordination and aligns the incentives.  
 The strength of relationship between lender and the secondary market can be 
tested using variations in the behavior of portfolio lenders. Ambrose et al (2005) examine 
the difference in default rates for loans sold to the secondary market and those retained 
on portfolio. Given the choice to sell or retain loans on portfolio, the reputation effect 
would predict that loans sold to the secondary market would be of higher quality. In fact, 
the results of the study support the reputation effect hypothesis because loans sold to the 
secondary market are less likely to default than those retained in the firms’ portfolios.  
Therefore, firms are retaining the poor quality loans while selling the high quality loans. 
This would suggest that asymmetric information concerns between lender and the sec-
ondary market are negligible.  
 It is important to clarify that the data used in Ambrose (2005) is provided by a 
bank. Although a portfolio lender, banks have additional regulatory considerations that 
need to be accounted for. The authors cannot exclude that the variation in the bank's be-
havior is due to capital arbitrage opportunity that surfaces in response to the Basel Ac-
cords. Specifically, the Basel Accords (Basel I) requires that banks hold 8% of each loan 
as capital, and the reserve requirement does not vary with risk of the loans.16 Therefore, 
for low risk loans the reserve requirement is too high, which creates the incentive to sell 
low risk loans and retain high risk loans in portfolio.  
                                                 
16 In 2004 the Basel Accords where modified (Basel II) to allow for variations in the reserve requirements 
based on the loan quality.   
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 The principal-agent problem between the lending segment and the secondary 
market is minimized due to the existence of complete contracts and a well established 
incentive structure. The main issue for the lender is in estimating  the consumers’ default 
risk with unobserved qualities. The revelation of the hidden qualities will not reduce the 
amount of loans supplied, but it will allow lenders to adjust the price of the loans to re-
flect the true quality.  
2.5 Conclusion 
 The growth of the secondary market, in conjunction with the technological ad-
vancements in the 1990s, has influenced the unbundling of services in the mortgage mar-
ket. Specialization and trade within the market have created efficiency gains. Coordina-
tion between the originating, underwriting, and financing service providers is necessary 
for information to flow through the supply chain. Although the market is complex and 
segmented, the standardization of mortgage products has made consumers more aware of 
the available products in the marketplace.   Consumers are easily matched with programs, 
and funding is easily accessible. All factors have contributed in making homeownership 
more feasible. 
 The recent near-collapse of the mortgage market would suggest that the funda-
mental structure of the market may not be viable. The segmentation of the market may be 
credited with an increased level of efficiency, yet it is due to this that the quality of in-
formation can diminish. Unbundling of mortgage services must be accompanied with 
more complete contracts and alignment of incentives.  
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 Third party originators’ lack of accountability and the incentives they confront do 
not match the remainder of the market. A market which has an objective to price and al-
locate risk efficiently cannot have agents who do not incur the cost of mispricing risk. 
Correcting the incentive structure is critical and necessary for the market to operate effi-
ciently. Without the correction, the existence of the TPO market is questionable. To align 
the incentives in the market, either TPOs will be forced to be accountable for loan per-
formance or they will vertically integrate with the lender.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
  
 
Refi IndexOneyear
Date
01/01/0801/01/0601/01/0401/01/02
O
ne
 Y
ea
r 
Tr
ea
su
ry
 B
ill
 (%
)  
5
4
3
2
1 2000
4000
6000
R
efi Index 
 
8000 
10000
 
 
Figure 2.1 One Year Treasury and MBA Refinance Index from 2002-2008:  
Mortgage Bankers Association weekly survey Refinance Index a measure of refinance application volume.  
The survey covers approximately 50 percent of all U.S. retail residential mortgage originations, and has 
been conducted weekly since 1990.  Respondents include mortgage bankers, commercial banks and thrifts.  
Base period and value for all indexes is March 16, 1990=100. One Year Treasury Rates are collected from 
yahoo finance http://finance.yahoo.com/  
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Mortgage 
Decision
• Decision to purchase a new home or refinance an existing 
Mortgage 
Search
• Consumer can search online or through retail markets
Origination
• Consumer contacts a lender directly or a Third Party Originator
Underwriting
• Lender underwrites the loan to ensure it meets secondary market 
guidlines
Funding
• Lender finances the loan through deposits or secondary market 
financing
Securitization
• Loan is either retained in lenders portfolio or sold to the secondary 
market (Government Sponsered Enteprises or Private Label)
Derivatives 
• The loans are pooled to form Mortgage Backed Securities. MBS are 
repooled to create Collaterlized Mortgage Obligations. 
 
Figure 2.2: The Mortgage Process and Market Segments 
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Figure 2.3: Composite Case-Shiller Home Price Index from 1985-2009 
The S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices (non-seasonally adjusted) are calculated monthly using a 
three-month moving average and published with a two month lag. Base year (January, 2000=100). 
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3. CHAPTER 3: A Model of Electronic Commerce in the Presence of a Gatekee-
per 
3.1 Introduction 
 The focus of this chapter is to examine the relationship between the consumer and 
originator of the mortgage. The objective is to develop a model which helps explain con-
sumers’ search processes and firms’ pricing strategies in response to electronic commerce 
in the mortgage market. At the initial phase of the mortgage decision, and after the con-
sumer has decided on obtaining a mortgage, the consumer must decide how to search for 
a mortgage product. Previously, consumers were required to physically visit their banks 
or other retail establishments to inquire about mortgage products and pricing. However, 
today, most consumers have access to the Internet and can now search through electronic 
markets.    
 The development of the Internet was expected to facilitate consumer search by 
eliminating transaction frictions, which would lead to more competitive markets. The 
drastic improvements in the availability of information to the consumer, in an environ-
ment of lower search costs, would create Bertrand competition in the market. To survive, 
firms are forced to compete by lowering prices toward the marginal cost of production. 
According to Stigler (1961) and Stahl (1989), it is expected that prices in online markets 
(low search cost and better-informed consumers) would be less dispersed and priced low-
er than traditional brick and mortar markets (high search cost and less-informed consum-
ers). However, empirical studies which examine price differences between online and 
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retail markets are inconclusive and do not provide a clear consensus about the effects of 
the Internet on market prices17.  
 While search cost models predict lower prices in online markets, they often as-
sume that the consumer is able to observe all price quotes available on Internet Compari-
son Search (ICS) sites. The online aggregator websites (gatekeepers) specialize in provid-
ing information to the consumer, which eliminates a significant amount of searches. At a 
single site, consumers can view all available prices rather than visit each retailer’s web-
site or retail office. The benefits to the consumer in the form of convenience and lower 
prices have been previously defined by search cost models. However, the outlined bene-
fits to the consumer imply that firms should be less willing to join the ICS sites due to the 
lower profits associated with increased information. A casual observation suggests that 
online markets are saturated with firms willing to provide pricing information to consum-
ers through the aggregator.   
 Baye and Morgan (2002) provide a model of online markets and establish the 
equilibrium outcome in the presence of an information gatekeeper. The gatekeeper reduc-
es search cost and increases information transparency, which allows the consumer to ob-
tain a lower price. In response, firms reduce their prices to attract more customers.  The 
equilibrium outcome is that online prices are lower than retail prices, and the gatekeeper 
restricts membership to the online market by charging an advertising fee to the firms. 
Consumers, however, are allowed to search for “free” in the online market.   
                                                 
17 See Bailey (1998), Lee (1998), and Brown and Goolsbee (2002). 
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 The premise for firm participation in online markets has been based solely on ex-
panding demand, as firms are willing to join the gatekeeper’s network for the opportunity 
to compete and attract a larger consumer base. Although online firms receive lower profit 
margins per unit, they are able to increase overall revenue—and thus also earn higher 
profits. I argue that a gatekeeper may purposefully reduce the competitive environment of 
online markets and thus attract firms interested in increasing their market power. The ga-
tekeeper attracts customers through a promise of lower search costs and accessibility to 
more information; it provides the member firms with a flow of captive consumers who 
believe they are observing the lowest prices in the market.  
 Lendingtree.com is an online gatekeeper that operates in the mortgage market. 
The firm’s market purpose is to reduce the consumers’ search cost by matching them 
with mortgage suppliers. Their slogan asserts that “when banks compete, you win,” 
which suggests consumers benefit by searching for mortgage prices on their site. Howev-
er, LendingTree is an intermediary that also provides firms on its network with a flow of 
consumers who were previously unattainable due to spatial limitations. Moreover, Len-
dingTree restricts the amount of price quotes the consumer observes by reducing the 
amount of firms competing to a fraction of the available firms on the network. When firm 
participation is restricted, the equilibrium prices may increase and firms may receive 
higher profits, which are unattainable without the presence of the gatekeeper. This setting 
differs from previous models, which focused on gatekeepers (or shopbots) that provide 
the consumer with price quotes from all firms participating on the network.  This change 
has neglected the gatekeeper’s anticompetitive conduct.  
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 In this dissertation, I provide an alternative explanation of the online market, 
where a gatekeeper restricts a firm's membership through price and thus only a small part 
of all firms will participate on the network. Additionally, consumers searching for price 
information will only observe a share of the available quotes.  The effect on market out-
comes will therefore depend on the gatekeeper’s conduct, and whether the search cost 
effect dominates the anticompetitive effect. 
3.2 The Consumer and Search Process 
 For example, let there be two types of consumers shopping for a homogenous 
good.  However, the consumers are heterogeneous in their cost of search for the good. 
The first type of consumers have zero search cost (i.e zero opportunity cost of time), such 
that they are willing to search over all available firms to gain price information. The 
second type of consumer has high search costs (high opportunity cost of time), and will 
search for price information at a subset of the available firms. The subscript i denotes the 
consumer type, where i=1 is the consumer with zero search costs and i=2 denotes the 
consumer with high search costs.  
3.2.1 Consumer Search Without Internet  
 Each consumer has a demand function ܦሺ݌ሻ. The consumer’s surplus when ob-
serving a price ܲ is given by eq 3.1: 
                    ࡯ࡿሺࡼሻ ൌ ׬ ࡰሺ࢞ሻࢊ࢞
ࡼ
࢈                                       (3.1) 
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The decision to conduct an additional unit of search depends on the expected consumer 
surplus from the search.  Given a price ܲ, the expected consumer surplus from an addi-
tional unit of search will also depend on the distribution of price in the economy, given 
by F(p). Therefore, the expected consumer surplus of an additional unit of search is given 
by integrating eq 3.2 with respect to the cumulative price distribution F(p): 
     ࡱ࡯ࡿሺࡼሻ ൌ ׬ ࡯ࡿሺ࢖ሻࢊࡲሺ࢖ሻ࢖࢈     (3.2) 
Here, b is the lower bound of the price distribution. If the expected gains to consumer 
surplus exceed the marginal cost of search, ܧܥܵሺܲሻ ൒ ܥ௜ , then the consumer will con-
duct an additional unit of search. Otherwise, the consumer will stop and purchase from 
the firm with the lowest observed price.  
 For a given price ݌Ԣ, the expected gains of an additional unit of search  for the 
consumers with zero search cost will exceed the expected gains for high search cost con-
sumers. Therefore, type one consumers will undertake more search than type two con-
sumers.  Let S denote the amount of search for each consumer type: 
                                                           ܁૚ሺ࢖′ ሻ ൐ ܁૛ሺ࢖′ ሻ                                       (3.3) 
Zero search cost consumers will visit all firms to gain price information and purchase 
from the firm with the lowest price. High cost consumers will search for the lowest price 
up to the point where the gains from additional search equal the cost of search. 
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3.3 Firm Behavior without the Internet 
 The firms know that there are two types of consumers that exist in the market, 
where ߤ fraction are type one consumers and (1- ߤ) are type two consumers. The firm 
cannot identify the individual consumer type but knows their proportion in population.  
Let there be N firms, all with constant marginal cost of production. The objective of the 
firm is to maximize expected profits subject to consumer types and demand. Firms do not 
observe consumer types and cannot price discriminate based on observable information. 
The firm will maximize expected profit and a single price will prevail in equilibrium. For 
simplicity I normalize the measure of consumers to unity and let pDሺpሻ ൌ Rሺpሻ . Firm i’s 
maximization problem is given in Stahl (1989) and is represented as: 
   ۳࣊࢏ሺ࢖, ࡲሺ࢖ሻሻ ൌ
ሺ૚ିࣆሻ܀ሺܘሻ
ࡺ
൅ ሺࣆሻ൫૚ െ ࡲሺ࢖ሻ൯
ࡺି૚
܀ሺܘሻ                         (3.4) 
The first term represents the fraction of high search cost consumers, which are shared by 
N firms in the market. The second term represents the revenue from the zero search cost 
consumers, where the firm obtains their business if their price is lower than N-1 other 
firms.  Finally, the firm has constant marginal cost ߜ ൌ 0 .  
The equilibrium is given by the cumulative price distribution that is a solution to: 
                                                  ׬ ࡯ࡿሺ࢖ሻࢊࡲሺ࢖ሻ࢘࢈ ൌ ࡯࢏                                                ( 3.5)  
   and:              
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                                                 ࡲሺ࢖ሻ ൌ ૚ െ ሾቀ૚ିࣆ
ࡺࣆ
ቁ ቀࡾ
ሺࡼ࢘ሻ
ࡾሺ࢖ሻ
െ ૚ቁሿ
૚
ࡺష૚,                          ( 3.6) 
  
 
where ܴሺ ௥ܲሻ ൌ ݉݅݊ሼݎ, ܲ௠ሽ ; r denotes the reservation price while ܲ௠  is the monopoly 
price.   As the search cost decreases, the price distribution converges towards the Ber-
trand outcome, with price equal to marginal cost.  
3.3.1 Firm Advertising Decision 
 The firm’s decision to advertise is a function of the advertising fee set by the ga-
tekeeper and the fraction of firms the gatekeeper allows the consumer to sample. If the 
gatekeeper drastically restricts the number of firms able to compete, market power in-
creases for the firms that are allowed to compete but reduces the probability the firm is 
selected as one of the competitors. If the gatekeeper allows all firms to supply a quote, 
the market power of the firm’s advertising falls but the probability that the firm’s quote is 
observed by the consumer increases. Therefore, there is an optimal level of restriction 
that will maximize firm participation. Simply, the firm will advertise only if the expected 
profits in online markets are equal or larger than the profits in retail markets. Let ߨ௜ீ de-
note profits through the gatekeeper (online) and ߨ௜ோ denote the profit in retail markets. 
For a firm to advertise it must be that: 
      ߨ௜ீ ൒ ߨ௜ோ     (3.7) 
3.3.2 Firm Pricing with the Internet 
 Assume that the online market has a small number of gatekeepers. Each of the N 
firms can choose to advertise by paying an advertising fee. In the mortgage market there 
are few gatekeepers that provide price comparison services. The market is dominated by 
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LendingTree18, but others like Lowermybills.com and Nextag.com also provide the same 
service. Consequently, each firm can choose to advertise in any or all of the gatekeepers’ 
sites. Since gatekeepers charge a fee for firms to advertise, a total ݊ ൑ ܰ firms will join 
the gatekeepers’ network. Furthermore, the gatekeeper further restricts the number of 
quotes the consumer observes to ܭ ൏ ݊ ൑ ܰ. 
  Given the decision to shop online or offline, a fraction ߤ of consumers will decide 
to shop offline and ሺ1 െμሻ will shop through online markets. It can be assumed that con-
sumers that choose to shop in retail markets will conduct their entire search within the 
offline market, and the fraction ሺ1 െ ߤሻ online consumers will search through gatekeeper 
markets only. In both offline and online markets, zero and positive search cost consumers 
exist. Let ߤଵ represent the fraction of offline consumers with zero search cost, and ߤଶ de-
notes the fraction of online consumers with zero search cost. 
 Consumers deciding to search through gatekeeper sites are interested in reducing 
the cost of their search. Searching online allows consumers to do this because they ob-
serve more quotes per unit of search. The fraction of consumers in online markets 
ሺ1 െ ߤଶሻ  with positive search cost will pay an effective cost of ܥ௜ீ for each unit of 
search. Thus, we can assume that the search cost in online markets is less than the search 
cost in retail markets:  
ܥ௜
ீ ൏ ܥ௜
ோ. 
                                                 
18 Chadwick Martin Bailey, Inc. conducted a study for LendingTree in June 2001 which measured the Total 
Brand awareness for firms in the online lending market. The study found that LendingTree has 2.5 times 
the awareness level of direct online competitors and exceeds the awareness of the top retail bank in the 
study. 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/LendingTree+Extends+No.+1+Brand+Awareness+Position+in+Online+Len
ding.-a078011256  
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 The described online and retail markets are two separated markets which may 
have different prices. Each market will have an equilibrium price distribution as de-
scribed in equations (3.5) and (3.6). For the retail market, the equilibrium is given by the 
price distribution ܨሺ݌ሻthat solves: 
                                                 ׬ ࡯ࡿሺ࢖ሻࢊࡲሺ࢖ሻ࢘࢈ ൌ ࡯࢏
ࡾ,                                                (3.8)                           
   and:             
                                                 ࡲሺ࢖ሻ ൌ ૚ െ ሾቀࣆିࣆ૚
ࡺࣆ૚
ቁ ቀࡾ
ሺࡼ࢘ሻ
ࡾሺ࢖ሻ
െ ૚ቁሿ
૚
ࡺష૚,                         (3.9)                           
For the online market, the equilibrium is given by the price distribution ܩሺ݌ሻ that solves: 
                                                ׬ ࡯ࡿሺ࢖ሻࢊࡳሺ࢖ሻ࢘࢈ ൌ ࡯࢏
ࡳ,                                               (3.10)                           
and:              
                                               ࡳሺ࢖ሻ ൌ ૚ െ ሾቀሺ૚ିࣆሻିࣆ૛
ࡺࣆ૛
ቁ ቀࡾ
ሺࡼ࢘ሻ
ࡾሺ࢖ሻ
െ ૚ቁሿ
૚
ࡷష૚,                   (3.11)    
The difference between the two solutions will depend on the parameters 
࡯࢏
ࡳ, ࡯࢏
ࡾ, ࣆ, ࣆ૚, ࣆ૛, ࡺ and ࡷ. Given that ࡯࢏ࡳ ൏ ࡯࢏ࡾ , the price in retail markets will be higher 
than prices in online markets. On the other hand, the number of firms competing in online 
markets is less than the number of firms competing in retail market, ࡷ ൏ ࡺ. The lower 
number of firms competing in the online market will cause price in online markets to ex-
ceed the price in retail markets. Consequently, the effect of online commerce on market 
outcomes is ambiguous and will depend on the gatekeeper’s conduct. If the gatekeeper 
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creates a market where the search cost effect dominates the anticompetitive effect (small 
K), then prices in online markets will be lower than prices in retail markets. Alternative-
ly, prices in online markets will be higher if search cost effect is dominated by the effect 
of a small number of competitors.                           
3.4 Gatekeeper Choice Variables 
 The gatekeeper will influence the market outcomes given its choice variables. The 
gatekeeper maximizes profits with respect to the subscription fee, the advertising fee, and 
the fraction of firms it allows to compete for each consumer (K).  The gatekeeper’s objec-
tive is to provide consumers and firms with benefits to joining the site, but extract as 
much of the gains as possible. Consumers will find it beneficial to join online search if 
their effective search costs are reduced.  
 The number of firms that choose to participate is a function of the advertising fee, 
the number of consumers shopping through the gatekeeper site, and the fraction of firms 
the gatekeeper allows to compete per quote (K). The gatekeeper needs to create an incen-
tive for firms to participate and must choose the optimal (K) to insure firms receive high-
er profits. Additionally, the gatekeeper’s advertising fee will extract profits from the firm. 
The fee can be a linear price or a two-part tariff.19  The profit to the firm must be larger 
or equal through the gatekeeper relative to retail market profits. 
 
 
                                                 
19 LendingTree charges multiple fees: a onetime membership fee, a “quote fee”  paid for the right to quote a 
price, and finally a “closing fee”  paid by the firm with the winning bid.  
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3.5 Conclusion 
 Search models assume that the Internet would facilitate trade by eliminating 
transaction frictions and consequently lead to more competitive markets. The drastic im-
provements in the availability of information to the consumer, in an environment of lower 
search costs, would create Bertrand competition in the market. This would force firms to 
compete by lowering prices toward the marginal cost of production.  
 Empirical studies examining price differences between online and retail markets 
have been inconclusive and do not provide a clear consensus about the effects of the In-
ternet on market prices. In this chapter, I provide an alternative explanation for the incon-
sistent empirical results. The competitive outcomes predicted due to lower search cost on 
the Internet are sensitive to the assumptions that the online consumer can observe all 
prices. However, when a gatekeeper is present, the gains from reducing search cost to the 
consumer may be offset by the gatekeeper’s conduct. When a gatekeeper restricts the 
quotes observable to the consumer, an anticompetitive effect exist. If the anticompetitive 
effect dominates the search cost effect, prices in online market will be higher than in re-
tail markets. 
 Therefore, the inconsistency in empirical results when examining the effect of the 
Internet on prices may be due to variations in gatekeeper conduct. An empirical test ex-
amining prices and profits in online versus retail markets would assist in identifying 
which effect dominates, the search cost effect or the anticompetitive effect.   
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4. CHAPTER 4: Joint Determination of Consumer Search Behavior and Mort-
gage Pricing 
4.1 Introduction 
 To accurately measure the effect of the internet on prices, two simultaneous ef-
fects must be accounted for. The first is the gains that are associated with lower search 
costs and an increase in availability of information to the consumer. On the other hand, 
firms may be able to collude because they can identify with certainty their direct competi-
tion and these competitors’ quoted prices. In a collusive environment, the transparency of 
pricing information reduces the firms’ cost of monitoring its competitors. Thus the effi-
ciency gains in online markets associated with lower search cost may be diluted by the 
gatekeepers’ conduct. When comparing price differentials in online and retail markets, 
empirical research has attributed any price difference solely to differences in consumer 
information; yet, the online and retail market structures differ in more dimensions. 
 The literature has assumed that consumers are essentially identical and heteroge-
neous only in their search costs and consequently their information sets. Each consumer’s 
search method is random in nature, and thus consumer characteristics do not influence 
their choice of market type. Additionally, firms are assumed to have homogenous cost 
structures regardless of their market of operations. This suggests that online firms are 
identical to retail firms and differ in their pricing strategies only. Although the assump-
tion helps simplify the model and can attribute price difference to consumer information, 
it is impractical in an empirical setting. Assuming away differences in cost across firms 
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also eliminates the possible scenario that firms price at their marginal cost; prices would 
then be dispersed according to variation in marginal costs.  
 I will present evidence of pricing differentials in online and offline markets for a 
single firm. Using micro-level data from a mortgage firm, I am able to examine the firm’s 
pricing strategies for their online customers relative to their retail customers. By examin-
ing a single firm I am able to eliminate firm heterogeneity as the reason for any price dif-
ferences and can reveal any differences in pricing strategies associated with the consum-
ers’ information sets and market structure. I examine the joint determination of consum-
ers’ choices between online and offline markets and the price they pay for a mortgage. 
This construct allows consumers’ characteristics to determine their method of search. The 
estimation method will allow for the interdependence between mortgage interest rates, 
profits, and the consumers’ market choices. I control for the interest rate and closing-cost 
trade off, which eliminates the prevailing endogeneity problem in mortgage pricing re-
search. This is possible in this study because of the availability of a unique data set which 
contains cost and revenue information and provides micro-level information about one 
particular firm’s operations and consumer characteristics. 
 Using a switching model to control for consumer selection into market type, I find 
two results: First, consumers’ unobservable characteristics do not influence their choice 
of commerce which supports previous literatures assumption that consumer choice to 
conduct searches online is a random process. Second, once consumers have made their 
choice and after controlling for observables, online customers pay the same price on av-
erage as their retail counterparts. Therefore, I find that access to less-costly information 
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in online markets has not led to lower prices of mortgages (rates). However, the results 
reveal the presence of an anticompetitive effect that offsets the reduced search cost effect. 
In a number of circumstances, and for a subset of loan types, the anticompetitive effect 
exceeds the search cost effect. Firms operating in the gatekeeper format are more able to 
price discriminate in online markets by loan duration and loan type, whereas the retail 
firm cannot differentiate its price with respect to consumer characteristics. Therefore the 
gains to the consumer from lower search costs are eliminated by the anticompetitive mar-
ket structure created by the gatekeeper in this market. When controlling for the variation 
in marginal cost between online and retail markets, I find that the firm earns higher prof-
its in online markets. This further highlights the presence of an anti-competitive effect in 
online market, which I argue is due to the dynamic nature of online markets and the gate-
keeper’s conduct. These results indicate that market structure plays a role and must be 
considered in further empirical studies when comparing online and retail price markets.  
 This chapter will progress as follows: Section 2 details the previous literature fo-
cusing on search costs and market structure. Section 3 includes background on the mort-
gage firm and internet comparison sites (ICS). Section 4 includes the empirical model 
used for estimation. Section 5 discusses the data and summary statistics. Section 6 in-
cludes the results. The chapter concludes in Section 7. 
4.2 Literature 
4.2.1 Search Theory 
 Neoclassical economics suggests that competitive markets with no externalities 
operate efficiently and that, because of the availability of information, a single price will 
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equilibrate both supply and demand. These perfectly competitive markets are characte-
rized by the law of one price, which means that all goods that are homogenous are priced 
identically and consumers are fully aware of the market-clearing price. This strict as-
sumption that all agents operate with full and perfect information helps simplify many 
complex economic models and thus is useful in many applications. Yet, theoretically rec-
ognized, perfectly competitive markets are rarely observed in daily consumer transactions 
(Stigler 1957). 
 Markets seldom have a single price that satisfies demand and supply, and usually 
we observe a dispersion of prices for what is characterized as a homogenous good. One 
can easily justify this anomaly as an outcome of a market that is in disequilibrium 
(Stiglitz 1979). However, price dispersion is overwhelmingly present in markets and thus 
raises questions about the underlying assumptions of the model. Economists interested in 
the phenomenon of price dispersion have cited two possible reasons. First, the assump-
tion of homogeneity is hard to establish. Goods sold in markets may not differ in the ba-
sic characteristics of the product and may seem homogenous; however, firm attributes 
may add (or detract) value to the product. Stigler (1961) expresses that absolute homo-
geneity of goods is nearly impossible when consumers include service by the firm or any 
other supplier characteristics. More important to the topic of this paper is the assumption 
of full and perfect information. A consumer entering a new market may not know the 
prevailing price in the market. To gain this information, the consumer must partake in a 
search process. 
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 The lack of information about the product or firm characteristics, as suggested by 
Stigler, violates the neoclassical assumption. Thus, prices in the economy may in fact be 
dispersed and consequently deviate from the expected uniform price outcome. The eco-
nomics literature has examined the consequence of violating the perfect information as-
sumption. 
 Theoretical literature on price dispersion often credits Stigler (1961) for establish-
ing the literature of costly information in his seminal paper, “The Economics of Informa-
tion.” A model of ignorance is first established by relaxing the Neoclassical assumption 
of full information. The model considers consumers in search of a good who are unaware 
of the price of the product in the market, and the assumption holds even if we assume the 
law of one price. Consumers must undertake the costly search for the price that meets 
their reservation price. The amount of search necessary is a function of individual charac-
teristics, specifically the opportunity cost of time and the fraction of income spent on the 
good. Consumers are heterogeneous in the cost of search for information, and conse-
quently firms can vary their prices according to this variability in consumer search costs. 
In the market, prices would be dispersed and would therefore violate the law of one price. 
 As consumers search, they gain information about the price dispersion and since 
consumers buy at the lowest offered price, this induces firms to lower their price and the-
reby reduces the dispersion of prices. Consumers have a higher incentive to search for 
price information for goods that are purchased frequently, by incurring the search costs 
only once and reducing their purchase price for every transaction thereafter. Thus we ex-
pect prices to be more dispersed in a durable goods market since consumers purchase this 
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type of good less frequently. Sorensen (2000) examines the price of prescription drugs in 
two different markets and observes that drugs purchased often are more likely to have a 
lower price. He attributes this to the consumer’s attempt to minimize the price of fre-
quently purchased goods, as search theory predicts. 
 Stigler finds that expected returns to additional search decrease with the amount 
of search. Also, the expected savings from searching will increase with the price disper-
sion observed in the markets. He states that there is an optimal amount of search, and it is 
possibly sequential in nature but leaves this point for others to explore.  Finally, he fore-
casts that, because of consumers’ desire to reduce search costs, firms will emerge whose 
sole purpose is to facilitate the dissemination of information to both buyers and sellers in 
the market. 
 A conclusion provided by Stigler’s model is that price uniformity is only possible 
when search costs are zero. If all consumers can search without any costs, then they have 
an incentive to shop all prices and will choose the lowest price. Firms respond by reduc-
ing their prices to a uniform price. In equilibrium the perfectly competitive price will 
prevail. If a uniform price exists and is above marginal costs, then each firm has an incen-
tive to reduce its price marginally and attract the entire market. Thus all firms will have 
normal profits in equilibrium with a price equal to marginal cost. Stigler proposes that it 
is unprofitable for firms to eliminate all dispersion in the market and may seek to create 
some information uncertainty. Recent research by Carlin (2009) has focused on informa-
tion complexity as a strategies of keeping price above marginal cost. Carlin shows that as 
consumers become more informed, the firms will increase the cost of information by add-
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ing complexity to their pricing structure. Consumers are therefore less likely to become 
informed, and their ignorance is a source of market power to the firms, as Scitovsky 
(1950) proposed. Ellison and Ellison (2009) also provide a model and some evidence of 
how firms in online markets are more likely to add friction in consumers’ search for in-
formation. 
 Hong and Shum (2006) established a model that allows estimation of search costs 
when observing a price distribution for a homogenous good. Their model is used to esti-
mate the search costs associated with two types of search processes, sequential and non-
sequential. A sequential search process is where the consumer, after each price observa-
tion, can decide to take the lowest price observed or continue to search for additional 
price quotes. A consumer employing this strategy will continue to search as long as the 
expected gain from finding a lower price exceeds the cost of search. Alternatively, a non-
sequential search is a process where the consumer purchases from the lowest priced firm 
after randomly sampling a predetermined number of firms. In the context of the mortgage 
industry, a consumer shopping on ICS sites is using a non-sequential search process, 
while the retail customer’s process is sequential. 
 The estimation procedure of Hong and Shum (2006) finds that sequential shop-
ping rules lead to higher search costs relative to non-sequential shopping rules.  However, 
Morgan and Manning (1985) indicate that non-sequential search is more favorable when 
there are positive fixed costs of searching. This is the case of searching for a mortgage. 
Organizing, collecting personal documentation, and completing a loan application are 
fixed costs. Whereas, the marginal costs of search are the cost of locating a firm, submit-
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ting the application, and discussing the loan with the bank/originator. The authors argue 
that online price shopping meets the assumptions of non-sequential search. However their 
measure of search costs is sensitive to the parameters in the model. 
 To obtain a measure of search costs in Hong and Shum’s model, it is necessary to 
include strict assumptions about the quantities purchased, specifically that each consumer 
purchases one unit of the good. A good that would meet that criterion is the market for 
books. However, consumers rarely purchase one book at a time. Thus calculations of 
search costs might be biased upward, since consumers are minimizing their search costs 
for the bundle of goods. Empirical tests of search costs usually do not have any informa-
tion on the consumer and therefore must make assumptions about their characteristics. 
My mortgage data includes consumer information and thus reduces the assumptions as-
sociated with estimation. 
 Hong and Shum argue that a measure of search cost would be more interesting if 
there are detailed individual-level data sets, which would help in identifying the consum-
er’s search costs. Additionally, the authors do not consider the possibility that consumers 
can move from one type of search process to the other. More precisely they assume that 
sequential shoppers will remain sequential indefinitely. For this study, the assumption is 
that shoppers do not switch from online markets to retail markets and vice versa. 
 Another expectation is that the reduction of search costs due to the use of ICS 
sites would increase the information available to consumers about the price distribution in 
the market. Stigler (1961) suggests that as consumers become more aware of the price 
distribution, firms competing for consumer business will reduce their markup to attract 
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the consumer.20 Thus as consumers gain information about the underlying distribution of 
prices, the market price will approach the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. Markets with in-
formed customers will pay a uniformly lower price and firms will receive normal profits 
when customers experience zero search costs. On the other hand, if customers have high 
search costs and therefore do not actively search for the lowest price, the average price 
will increase and the market will observe a dispersion of prices. 
 Stigler’s model assumes that consumers are homogenous and gain information 
uniformly. Stahl (1989) extends Stigler’s theory to allow for both informed and “totally 
ignorant” consumers to exist in the market. However, in Stahl’s model, consumers know 
the Nash equilibrium (NE) distribution of prices before they begin their search and obtain 
each firm’s pricing information as they search. Firms set their price in response to con-
sumers’ search cost and the NE price distribution. The result of the model is that consum-
ers’ reservation price is endogenously determined, and prices are dispersed in equilibrium 
due to firms’ mixed strategy. Additionally, Stahl’s model supports both the Bertrand and 
Diamond equilibrium. Diamond (1971) presents a model with heterogeneous consumers, 
where each individual has a varying cost of search, but if all consumers have a positive 
cost of search, the market price will be the monopoly price. In that case each firm has an 
incentive to increase its price by an amount equal to the cost of search to the consumer 
with the lowest cost. If each firm follows these rules, then in equilibrium one price exists 
at the monopoly price. Stahl’s model yields the Diamond equilibrium: When the popula-
tion with zero search costs is set to equal 0 (all consumers are totally ignorant), the equi-
                                                 
20 Markup margins are referred to as yield spread premiums or overages. 
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librium will yield the monopoly price outcome; when it is set to 1 (all consumers are fully 
informed), the equilibrium result is the Bertrand outcome. 
 In the context of this research, customers applying through retail locations are 
perceived to have higher search costs. Individuals applying online use the internet to re-
duce their cost of search. The firm predicts that, because of the high cost of search, cus-
tomers will not incur the cost of visiting multiple retail locations. Higher search cost in-
creases the probability of the quoted price being the lowest price observed by the custom-
er, thus increasing the incentive for the firm to quote a price higher than the competitive 
price. The firm can gain a customer’s business as long as the price offered is marginally 
below the client’s reservation price. 
4.2.2 The Internet as a Search Cost Reducer 
 Empirical research has been inconclusive in determining whether the internet has 
lowered the price of online products relative to retail prices. By investigating the car 
market, Lee (1998) finds that car prices online are higher relative to retail prices, while 
Morton et al. (2005) find that new cars sold on online markets are priced 2.2% lower than 
in retail markets. Lee concludes that the quality differences of second-hand cars in online 
markets exceed that of cars sold at retail dealerships and as a result is capturing the price 
differential due to quality. He argues that the dispersion in prices is due to the hetero-
geneity of the good. Moreover, he attributes the higher prices to online customers’ wil-
lingness to pay a premium for the convenience of purchasing a car without having to 
leave the comfort of their homes. 
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 Bailey (1998) examines the market for books, CDs, and software and finds that 
online prices are higher relative to prices at retail stores. He attributes the higher prices to 
the infancy of online markets and predicted that lower prices will emerge as online com-
merce flourishes and consumers use online markets more frequently to gain information. 
Bailey’s research differs from Lee’s by examining a market of homogenous goods. In 
addition to the concerns due to quality, Bailey cites inefficiency in Lee’s study associated 
with the online market examined. Lee’s study examined online auctions for second-hand 
cars, specifically. A characteristic of an auction is that the good is sold to the consumer 
with the highest willingness to pay, and therefore auction prices are likely to be higher in 
general when compared with sales between two individuals. 
 Brown and Goolsbee (2002) examine the relationship between the price of term 
life insurance and a measure of each state’s internet usage as an instrument for search ac-
tivity and information. They find that an increase in internet usage decreased price dis-
persion as well as average price of term life insurance. They also measure the premiums 
before and after the development of the internet and find that the premiums after the in-
ternet are lower and less dispersed. They conclude that the internet reduces search costs 
and therefore reduces the market price and increases consumer surplus. 
4.2.3 The Internet as an Anti-competitive Market 
 The view of online markets as anticompetitive environments has been theoretical-
ly represented but mostly neglected in the empirical literature. The overwhelming belief 
that the internet is a benefit to the consumer has predominated. Baye and Morgan (2002) 
developed a model that incorporates the presence of a gatekeeper in online markets. They 
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find that although the gatekeeper can successfully limit its membership, the severe Ber-
trand competition will lead to lower prices in the online market. However, their model 
centers on a gatekeeper that does not limit the available quotes to the consumer and pro-
vides the consumer with pricing information from all of the members on the network. 
They also provide the optimal fee structure for the gatekeeper, such that the fee should be 
imposed only on firms and not consumers. The rationale is that firms will be willing to 
pay for the flow of consumers that are provided by the gatekeeper. Their approach simpl-
ifies the gatekeeper’s role to an advertiser for the network of firms and disregards any 
market structure implications.  
  Chen et al. (2002) developed a model where “infomediaries” refer consumers to 
retailers. They find that the intermediary benefits the consumers by facilitating the flow 
of information. A firm’s profits are U-shaped with respect to the intermediaries’ reach, 
and its profits increase as a result of the increase in demand attributed to the firm’s ability 
to gain consumers who had not been accessible to them previously. However, since the 
firm is encroaching on the retail competitor’s clientele, eventually it will create a compet-
itive effect, where prices and profits are reduced for both the retail and online firms. Fi-
nally, when there are equal fractions of consumers in both the internet and retail shopping 
markets, the firm can price discriminate by providing different prices in online and retail 
markets.  
 An alternative approach is to consider the dynamic environment the gatekeeper 
creates. Campbell et al. (2005) provides a model that takes into account the dynamic na-
ture of competition in online markets. The approach that search models take has been 
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static in nature and measures price variation with respect to a difference in search costs. 
When including firm behavior and their ability to monitor each other’s prices, even when 
observations are imperfect, it is easier for firms to collude. Thus the welfare gains due to 
lower search costs are eliminated by the anticompetitive market. When firms cannot 
monitor each other’s prices and if the fraction of shoppers increases, average prices fall 
as predicted by search theory. 
 Given the mixed findings when examining the effect of the internet on prices, re-
cent empirical studies have begun to hypothesize and test for market power and profita-
bility inonline markets. Hitt and Frei (2002) study the differences of the characteristics 
and behaviors of consumers in the online and retail market. Their study focuses on the 
banking sector and finds that online consumers are more profitable to the bank due to un-
observable characteristics. Although their study does not specifically examine prices, 
their findings support the existence of a more profitable online market relative to the re-
tail market. They attribute the higher profits to the loyalty of online consumers, higher 
balances and their greater propensity to adopt new banking services. This evidence fur-
ther supports the hypothesis that consumers’ behavior in online markets provides the 
firms additional market power. 
 A study by Viswanathan et al. (2007) explores the role of gatekeepers in online 
markets and provides an alternative explanation for the inconsistent empirical findings. 
They distinguish the types of gatekeepers by the information provided to the consumer. 
Gatekeepers can be divided into two categories; those that provide product comparisons 
and those that allow for price comparisons. Examining the automobile industry, they find 
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that consumers pay a higher price when the consumer searches online to compare prod-
ucts (i.e comparing car models). Alternatively, when consumers are conducting searches 
on pricing information and are comparing prices, they pay lower prices in online markets 
relative to the retail market. This study is the first to highlight the differences among ga-
tekeepers and how the differences might impact the market outcome. Since gatekeepers 
differ in the information they provide, information serves as a mechanism for firms to 
segment the market and price discriminate accordingly. Thus, not all online searches will 
lead to consumers paying lower prices relative to the retail market. The price consumers 
pay will ultimately depend on the type of information they search for.  
4.3 The Mortgage Industry: Date Source, Markets and Consumers 
4.3.1 The Mortgage Industry and Data Source 
 According to the Mortgage Bankers Association, in 2009 total mortgage transac-
tions totaled $2.1 trillion dollars.21 Outstanding mortgage debt accounts for $10 trillion, 
and represents roughly one quarter of the total outstanding debt in the United States. 
Home equity accounts for one fifth of total household  wealth accumulation (Belsky and 
Prakken 2004). However large and important, the mortgage industry remains a market 
characterized by asymmetric information. Loan brokers have access to multiple loan pro-
grams and wholesale pricing rates that the customer does not observe. The market has a 
high degree of product differentiation, which yields higher search costs to the consumer. 
As predicted by Stigler (1961), new firms emerged in the market to facilitate the trans-
mission of information between sellers and buyers. Beginning with LendingTree in 1997, 
                                                 
21 In 2004, the peak in mortgage transactions, mortgage originations totaled $4 trillion dollars 
http://www.mbaa.org/files/Bulletin/InternalResource/73418_.pdf  
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several ICS sites began to bridge the information gap.22 Customers searching for mort-
gage products and price information are now able to obtain it through these ICS sites, 
therefore creating an environment where firms compete for the clients’ business. 
 The data used in the empirical study in this paper were acquired from a mortgage 
firm after it became insolvent in August 2007. The firm purged the data of any consumer 
personal information, and approved its use solely for academic research. The mortgage 
firm operated as a mortgage broker and banker headquartered in Louisville, Kentucky, 
and conducted business in 22 states. To expand its customer base and diversify its busi-
ness beyond Kentucky, the firm joined several ICS sites. The firm classified itself as an 
online mortgage company in view of the fact that most of its business was obtained 
through the ICS sites. However, the firm did not limit its operations to ICS customers; 
services were offered through the main branch in Louisville, Kentucky, as well. Retail 
operations were supported via local advertising, telemarketing, customer “call ins,” and 
referrals. 
 The firm was established in 2002, during what has become known as the “refi 
boom.” After the first year of business, it joined the LendingTree network and eventually 
18 other ICS sites. Nonetheless, LendingTree accounted for 83% of the firm’s online 
                                                 
22 Lowermybills.com, mortgagequote.com, banxquote.com and Bankrate.com are some of the other ICS. 
On May 19th 2010, Banxquote.com filed an antitrust law suit against LendingTree for price fixing and col-
lusion with other competitors. http://finance.yahoo.com/news/Federal-Antitrust-Complaint-prnews-
2134255318.html?x=0&.v=1  
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business. The firm was able to compete for customers who applied through the ICS sites 
for a mortgage in any of the 22 states.23 
4.3.2 The Internet 
 Consumers interested in receiving a quote for a mortgage can apply online 
through LendingTree. LendingTree is the industry leader in online lending and mortgage 
comparison sites.24 According to the LendingTree’s latest 10-K filing to the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), their biggest competitors in the price comparison 
market are lending institutions entering the online market.25  While firms like lowermy-
bills.com, and nextag.com are in the mortgage price comparison market, they cannot 
compete with the brand awareness of LendingTree. A study by Chadwick Martin Bailey, 
Inc. in June 2001 found that LendingTree has 2.5 times the awareness level of direct on-
line competitors and exceeds the awareness of the top retail bank in the study. 
  During the application process with LendingTree, customers provide personal 
information including social security number, requested loan amount, and loan program. 
This information enables LendingTree to obtain a credit score for every applicant. Each 
application is sent to 5 firms26 on the network27 that are licensed in the state the property 
is located in. LendingTree has a complex predictive modeling system that matches lend-
ers and customers to ensure the highest probability of success. This matching process 
takes into account customers’ credit score, the loan program requested, the lenders’ cus-
                                                 
23 The Firm Operated in AK, CA, CO, CT, FL, GA, IL,  IN, KY, MA, MD, ME, MI, MN, MO, NC, OH, 
TN, TX, VA, WI, and WY 
24 http://www.mortgagemag.com/news/2009/0316/1000010309070.htm  
25 http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/financials/drawFiling.asp?formType=10-K  
26 Loan applications were sent to 4 firms up to February 1, 2004. 
27 As of 10/23/07 there were 303 firms on the LendingTree Network. As of 9/16/09, there were 216 firms. 
Some firms operate nationally, while others operate in selected states. 
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tomer service performance, and the lenders’ past success with the requested loan program 
and credit score. 
 A competing firm is able to provide up to 3 distinct quotes to each customer re-
ferred by LendingTree. The three quotes can be differentiated by loan type (fixed, adjust-
able rate mortgage, or home equity line), duration, and/or closing costs. If the applicant 
meets the credit score requirements for all 5 network firms, the applicant will receive a 
maximum of 15 offers. However, the firms choosing to offer a quote cannot observe how 
many other firms are competing for the client or, in theory which firms they are compet-
ing against. However, using state licensing information and the LendingTree list of par-
ticipants, it is possible to approximate which firms can compete in each market. If the 
applicant’s credit score, or the loan requested do not meet the guidelines for available 
products, firms can choose not to provide a quote. It is possible that the applicant receives 
no offers when applying, but that is rare; it is more likely that firms will provide the cus-
tomer with a quote on an alternative loan product. 
 Firms incur a flat fee for the opportunity to compete for the customer’s business. 
Additionally, the firm that provides the “winning” bid on a loan and completes the trans-
action is required to pay a computer loan origination fee (CLO) to LendingTree from the 
proceeds of the loan. The fee is a function of the type of loan, loan amount, and customer 
credit score; at times this fee can exceed $1000. LendingTree is able to extract profits 
from the network of firms and thus there is the presumption that firms experience above-
normal profits by joining the network. This is a contradiction to the outcomes implied in 
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search models, which predict lower profits in online markets due to the increase in avail-
able information to the consumer. 
 As part of the mortgage firm’s management decision, all online loans were sub-
ject to the same fee structure regardless of which ICS site provided the application.28  
Therefore, loan originators are responsible for paying the fee to the ICS; consequently 
they know in advance the cost associated with online customers and are able to price 
loans and their commissions accordingly. Customers search online to find the lowest 
price and do not explicitly observe any cost of applying through the ICS site. 
 Loan originators are mortgage broker/banker employees who provide the service 
of matching the customer with the mortgage. At the majority of broker firms, loan offic-
ers are commission-based employees and they earn income from a loan in two ways. The 
loan originators can charge the customer a loan origination fee for the service provided or 
offer the customer an interest rate higher than the wholesale price in order to receive a 
yield spread premium (YSP). More commonly, loan originators receive income through 
both sources. 
4.3.3 The Retail Consumer 
 Any application to the firm that is not received through an ICS site is considered a 
retail transaction: business is obtained through local advertising, word of mouth referral, 
and any direct call or email from the consumer. Retail consumers’ search is a non-
sequential process, where each consumer observes one price quote per unit of search. 
                                                 
28 Since the majority of loans where obtained from the LendingTree network and since the LendingTree 
fees are highest amongst all ICS sites, the firm used LendingTree pricing for all its loans. 
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Additionally, the firm does not have any information about how many quotes the con-
sumer has received prior to current application. 
 The only information available to the firm are the retail consumer’s characteristics 
and the loan program requested. The firm is uncertain about the consumer’s search beha-
vior or what competitors it is in direct competition with. The firm’s objective is to quote a 
price that is marginally lower than the consumer’s reservation price. Since the reservation 
price is a function of the consumer’s information about the price distribution in the econ-
omy, the firm is uncertain about the consumer’s reservation price.29  The firm assumes 
that retail consumers have a higher search cost than online consumers, since it is neces-
sary for them to undertake additional search to gain additional information. From search 
theory perspective, retail consumers should receive higher prices than online consumers 
because of their higher search cost. However, since the firm is uncertain about the retail 
consumer’s information set, it is possible that the firm would price its product at a lower 
price than search theory would predict. 
4.4 Empirical Model and Specification 
 Theory has established that better-informed consumers should receive lower pric-
es than those who are less informed. To test whether online customers receive a different 
price than offline customers, it is possible to estimate mortgage prices controlling for all 
default and prepayment risk correlates and including an online or retail dummy variable. 
                                                 
29 Further research will examine differences in the firm’s success in converting applications to closed loans 
in both markets. If firms are able to convert more applications in online market, this is evidence that firm is 
able to better predict the consumers ‘ reservation price 
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Table 3.1 includes some of the default and prepayment variables expected to affect the 
pricing of a mortgage: 
    ࢏ ൌ ࢼ૙ ൅ ࢼ૚ࢄ૚࢏ ൅ ࢼ૛ࡰ ൅ ࢿ                                             (4.1) 
 The interest rate paid on a mortgage is a function of the probability of default or 
prepayment of the loan. Thus, the exogenous variables would include all variables that 
increase or decrease the probability of default or prepayment of the loan, such as credit 
score, the loan-to-property-value ratio, whether the loan is a purchase or refinance, and 
the consumer’s net worth. A refinance loan, more specifically, can be considered either a 
cash-out loan or a rate/term loan. If the proceeds of the loan are used to pay off debt other 
than the mortgage, or if the borrower is liquidating the equity of the house, the loan is 
considered a cash-out loan. Since the customer is extracting equity from the house, a 
cash-out loan will have a higher default likelihood compared with a refinance loan that is 
acquired to adjust the loan term or loan rate only. Therefore, the borrower receives a 
higher interest rate on cash-out loans because of the higher probability of default. Pre-
payment risk is associated with the likelihood of the consumer paying the loan in full be-
fore the maturity date. Consumers who face a higher liquidity constraint, specifically 
those with a higher net worth or liquid assets, are in the position to pay the mortgage be-
fore its maturity. If online consumers are more informed, they will receive lower rates 
than offline consumers and consequently ߚଶ ൐ 0. However, the above specification suf-
fers from several econometric issues. 
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 The dependent variable is the price of the mortgage. Mortgages can be priced us-
ing a two-part pricing method. The first price is the interest rate, which is usually quoted 
in newspapers and has been used as evidence of dispersion in prices.30   
 The other price is the fee or points paid to the broker. A borrower can gain a low-
er interest rate if they are willing to pay higher origination fees.  Any specification that 
does not control for the endogeneity between interest rate and points will be biased. A 
more-accurate dependent variable would be the total price paid by the consumer: interest 
rate plus points or total commission paid to the broker. To control for this endogeneity, I 
constructed an APR measure which takes into account the note rate plus the fees per dol-
lar of loan.31 The APR variable represents the revenue (in percent of loan amount) from 
each loan. 
 Each customer receives an ܣܴܲ, where ܣܴܲ  is a function of the mortgage inter-
est rate ݅ at time ݐ and upfront costs ܷ. 
    ࡭ࡼࡾ࢏࢚ ൌ ࢌሺࡵ࢏൫ࡾ࢚, ࢌ࢏࢚, ࡰሺࢄ࢏ሻ, ࡼሺࢄ࢏ሻ൯, ࢁ࢏ሺࢄ࢏ሻሻ                 (4.2) 
 The consumer’s interest rate ܫ௜  is a function of the prevailing market interest rate 
ܴ at time ݐ  and the margin at which firm ݆ receives its funds ௝݂௧ at time ݐ. Additionally, 
the interest rate includes a default premium ܦሺ ௜ܺሻ and prepayment risk ܲሺ ௜ܺሻ, which 
represents the additional interest rate consumer ݅  pays for their default and prepayment 
risk. 
                                                 
30 Baye, M. R. and J. Morgan (2002). "Information gatekeepers and price discrimination on the internet." 
Economics Letters 76(1): 47-51. 
31 APR is the effective interest rate after controlling for the fees paid by the consumer. See Appendix for 
method of calculating the APR.  
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 In constructing the dependent variable, I assume that the firm’s cost ௝݂  is constant 
through time; and, since the analysis focuses only on one firm, it is possible to 
place  ௝݂௧ ൌ ܭ. F32F  However, in a multi-firm analysis it is necessary to add firm dummy 
variables, as to control for the cost of capital and any other firm-level variations in the 
pricing of default and prepayment risk.  The variable ܴ௧ can be replaced by the 10-year 
Treasury rate at time ݐ. Some studies have included year dummy variables to control for 
macroeconomic conditions, although a daily measure of macroeconomic conditions is 
more suitable. The time at which all variables are calculated is the date when the loan is 
closed. The actual date the rate is assigned (lock date) is not included in the firm’s data, 
since loan processing time may take 30 to 60 days33. Using the market interest rate on the 
day the loan is closed may introduce measurement error. Crawford and Rosenblatt (1999) 
found that there are differences in when consumers decide to “lock” the rate. There may 
be benefits to keep the rate “floating” during the loan processing if the consumer believes 
that market interest rates will fall in the near future. The dependent variable can now be 
expressed as measuring the default and prepayment risk premium of person ݅. 
  ࡰࢋࢌࢇ࢛࢒࢚ ࡾ࢏࢙࢑࢏ ൅ ࡼ࢘ࢋ࢖ࢇ࢟࢓ࢋ࢔࢚ ࡾ࢏࢙࢑࢏ ൌ ࡭ࡼࡾ࢏࢚ െ ࡾ࢚ ൌ ࡷ૙ ൅ ࢼ૚ࢄ࢏ ൅ ࢿ࢏   (4.3) 
                                  ࡼ࢘࢏ࢉࢋ࢏ ൌ ࢼ૙ ൅ ࢼ૚ࢄ࢏ ൅ ࢼ૛ࡰ ൅ ࢿ࢏       (4.4)   
 Estimating equation (3.4) using ordinary least squares (OLS) will provide esti-
mates of the coefficient for each credit risk variable. If a dummy variable ܦ is included, it 
will estimate the pricing differential for online customers relative to offline customers, 
                                                 
32 This is a strict assumption, and the focus of chapter 4 examines variations in  ௝݂௧. However for this analy-
sis I use year fixed effects to control for variations in the cost of capital.  
33 Siemens and Benjamin (1990). 
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which is not associated with consumers’ default or prepayment risk. More specifically, 
the coefficient of the dummy variable should capture any pricing variations associated 
with consumer information. If additional information does not provide the customer with 
any benefits, then the coefficient would be equal to zero. However, to ensure that omitted 
variable bias is not introduced, all risk variables that are considered by mortgage under-
writers must be included. 
 Because of the extensive list of variables examined by underwriters when pricing 
mortgage products, empirical studies are commonly plagued with omitted variable bias. 
Data sets provided by firms rarely include the entire list of risk variables, and therefore 
researchers are often attempting to estimate the size and direction of the bias associated 
with limited data (Dietrich 2005).  Regulatory data sets that contain national information 
on mortgage denials, such as the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), usually ex-
clude at least one risk variable. The HMDA data are used extensively to examine racial 
differences in mortgage denial rates, yet the data set does not include the applicant’s cre-
dit score, a major determinant of default risk. The repercussion in this research is that if 
an underwriting variable is omitted from the data set and if it is correlated with the con-
sumer’s market type, then it would cause the error term to be correlated with the market 
dummy variable and thus the coefficient on the dummy variable will be biased. 
 The data set utilized in this empirical study does not include several variables that 
are usually associated with prepayment and default risk underwriting. Specifically, con-
sumer income, wealth, and debt information are unobserved. However, that information 
was available to the loan underwriters. If online consumers are wealthier than retail con-
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sumers, the online dummy variable will absorb the effect wealth has on mortgage pricing 
and lead to a biased online coefficient. To eliminate the omitted variable bias and to con-
struct a more homogenous set of loans, I utilize Federal National Mortgage Association 
(FNMA) and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) guidelines and limit 
the sample to “Agency” loans. The reduced sample includes loans with identical default 
and prepayment risk characteristics as priced by FNMA and FHLMC. Loans with iden-
tical default and prepayment risk will have an identical qualifying interest rate. If omitted 
variabales are correctly controlled for then any variation in the price paid by consumers is 
due to their ability to reduce their markup (overage). However, if one of the omitted vari-
able is also correlated with consumer bargaining power and market choice then the esti-
mation will still remain biased.  
 Assuming omitted variable bias is controlled for, then in this specification the 
coefficient of risk characteristics ߚଵ should be equal to zero.  A positive (negative) coef-
ficient is interpreted as an increase (decrease) in the consumer’s bargaining power. In-
cluding an online dummy variable will capture any reduction in markups or overages as-
sociated with an increase in the availability of information to the consumer and the firm’s 
market power. The default and prepayment risk price can be considered the marginal cost 
of providing the loan; any price above can be regarded as profits to the firm. 
 By comparing the variation in the firm’s markup strategies, I can observe if inter-
est rates vary depending on the clientele in each market. Specifically I will test whether 
firms are able to price discriminate according to the search costs incurred by the consum-
er. If online markets reduce the search costs and cause a reduction in information asym-
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metries, customers should be able to negotiate lower prices. Therefore, I can observe if 
the mortgage firm considers online markets as more competitive and test whether the on-
line market prices approach the Bertrand equilibrium, where prices and profits are lower 
relative to retail markets. Alternatively, if LendingTree’s policies facilitate tacit collu-
sion, then consumers will not be able to be aggressive negotiators.  
 Since each customer choice between online and retail firms is a function of their 
search costs, and not randomly assigned, the OLS estimation of the model would not 
yield consistent estimates of the coefficients. To correct for the endogenous market 
choice, I employ a switching model. This enables me to identify the interest rate for each 
customer if they chose the alternative market to conduct their mortgage transaction. 
 Consumers maximize their expected consumer surplus given their search cost and 
the underlying distribution of total mortgage prices (denoted by APR)   
        ࡱ࡯ࡿሺ࡯ሻ ൌ ׬ ࡯ࡿሺ࡭ࡼࡾሻࢊࡲሺ࡭ࡼࡾሻࢉ࢈                       (4.5) 
Consequently, consumers will search online if the gains from online shopping exceed 
their reservation   ߩ௜. 
                   ࡼ࢘࢏ࢉࢋ࢏ࢌ െ ࡼ࢘࢏ࢉࢋ࢏࢕ ൐ ࣋࢏                                       (4.6) 
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where ܲݎ݅ܿ݁௜௢ denotes the rate for individual  ݅  in online markets and ܲݎ݅ܿ݁௜௙ denotes 
the rate for the individual in offline or retail markets. Thus, the consumer shops and pur-
chases online if the expected gains of online commerce are greater than their reservation 
rate  ߩ௜. 
  
 
The reservation rate  ߩ௜ is a function of the individual characteristics   ௜ܺ and search costs 
ܥ௜. 
      ࣋࢏ ൌ ࢻࢄ࢏ ൅ ࡮࡯࢏ ൅ ࣕ࢏૚                           (4.7) 
 The individual characteristics in the empirical test will include observable loan 
variables. Search costs are unobservable; therefore for identification purposes I need to 
include exclusion restriction. As an exclusion restriction, I include the distance of the 
property from the firm’s office.34  Consumers further away from the home office incur a 
higher search cost of visiting the firm and would therefore be more likely to apply online. 
Since the distance should not affect the price a consumer pays for a mortgage, it is not 
included in the price equation. Additionally, I use the Census data on average income by 
zip code as an instrument to proxy for the individual’s income. It is assumed that individ-
uals with higher income would have higher opportunity cost of searching and therefore 
would be more likely to shop online to reduce their search costs. Another instrument used 
is Census data on average education by Zip Code. More-educated consumers may be 
more likely to be familiar with the benefits of the internet and will shop online. Thus we 
can estimate: 
      ࡯࢏ ൌ ࢽ૚ ൅ ࢽ૛ࢄ࢏ ൅ ࢽ૜ࢆ࢏ ൅ ࣕ૛࢏                                      (4.8) 
   ࡼ࢘࢏ࢉࢋ࢏ࢌ െ ࡼ࢘࢏ࢉࢋ࢏࢕ ൐ ࢻࢄ࢏ ൅ ࢼሺࢽ૚ ൅ ࢽ૛ࢄ࢏ ൅ ࢽ૜ࢆ࢏ ൅ ࣕ૛࢏ሻ ൅ ࣕ૚࢏                  (4.9) 
            ࡼ࢘࢏ࢉࢋ࢏ࢌ െ ࡼ࢘࢏ࢉࢋ࢏࢕ ൐ ሺࢻ ൅ ࢼࢽ૛ሻࢄ࢏ ൅ ࢼࢽ૚ ൅ ࢼࢽ૜ࢆ࢏ ൅ ࢼࢿ૛࢏ ൅ ࣕ૚࢏             (4.10) 
                                                 
34 Graph 3 provides state difference between online and retail loans. 
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Thus we can rewrite eq (4.8) as a probit model, where the consumer shops online if 
߬௜
כ ൐ 0 and retail otherwise. Following Lee (1978) , where 
           ࣎࢏כ ൌ ࢽ૚ ൅ ࢽ૛ࢄ࢏ ൅ ࢽ૜ࢆ࢏ ൅ ࣕ࢏                             (4.11) 
    ࡱሾࡼ࢘࢏ࢉࢋ࢏࢕|ࡻሿ ൌ ࣂ࢕૚ ൅ ࢄ࢏ࣂ࢕૛ ൅ ࣌૚ࢿሺ
ࢌሺି࣐࢏ሻ
૚ିࡲሺି࣐ሻሻ
ሻ                       (4.12) 
   ࡱൣࡼ࢘࢏ࢉࢋ࢏ࢌหࢌ൧ ൌ ࣂࢌ૚ ൅ ࢄ࢏ࣂࢌ૛ െ ࣌૛ࢿሺ
ࢌሺି࣐࢏ሻ
ࡲሺି࣐ሻሻ
ሻ                                                (4.13) 
    ࣎࢏ ൌ ࢾ૙ ൅ ࢾ૚ሺ࢖࢘࢏ࢉࢋ࢏ࢌ െ ࡼ࢘࢏ࢉࢋ࢏࢕ሻ ൅ ࢾ૛ࢄ࢏ ൅ ࢽ૜ࢆ࢏ ൅ ࣕ࢏                  (4.14) 
errors are distributed trivariate normal with covariance matrix 
ߗ ൌ ቎
ߪఌଶ ߪఌ௢ ߪఌ௙
ߪఌ௢ ߪ௢ଶ .
ߪఌ௙ . ߪ௙
ଶ
቏ 
 The switching model will allow an examination of the joint determination of the 
propensity to conduct online search (equation 4.11) and the effects of lower search costs 
on the price of mortgage for each consumer type (equation 4.12 and 4.13). The inclina-
tion to reduce search costs will depend on the gains to the consumer from online com-
merce, which is the latent variable  ߬௜  (equation 4.14). Since I do not observe the price 
each consumer pays in both markets and observe only the price a consumer pays after 
their selection into the market type, I must estimate  ߬௜כ and control for the selection on 
unobservables in the price equations.  
 Using the inverse Mills ratio, I estimate the price equations conditional on selec-
tion into each market. Therefore equations 4.12 and 4.13 will allow the estimation of the 
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price conditional on the consumer selecting the online market and retail market, respec-
tively. By assumption ߪఌ ൌ 1, therefore the covariances ߪఌ௢ and ߪఌ௙ can be rewritten as 
ߪ௢ߩ଴ఌ and ߪ௙ߩ௙ఌ , where ߩ௢ఌ and ߩ௙ఌ are the correlation coefficients. If the error terms in 
the price equations are uncorrelated with the error in the propensity equation, the estima-
tion is reduced to a pooled OLS. A switching model is efficient and provides consistent 
standard errors by employing the full-information maximum likelihood method (FIML) 
to simultaneously estimate the propensity to conduct online commerce and the price equ-
ations for each market type. Although The FIML is efficient among all simultaneous equ-
ation models, it is computationally burdensome and may provide difficulties in conver-
gence. A Limited-information maximum likelihood (LIML) approach is usually preferred 
for its simplicity35 and robustness to non-normality. An alternative method is to use the 
Heckman two-stage least squares (2SLS), which utilizes a LIML estimation process. 
While robust, the LIML is not as efficient as the FIML. 
4.5 Data 
 The mortgage firm made available its customer database, which includes all loan 
applications submitted through ICS sites and retail locations. The data span five years 
from 2002 to 2007, where the firm received 41,054 loan applications. 
 This study will examine the differences in the business obtained by the firm, more 
specifically the difference in price paid by online customers and retail customers. Thus, I 
limit the sample to include only completed transactions (loans closed) and restrict the 
                                                 
35 Greene, W. (2003). Econometric Analysis, Prentice Hall. 
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sample period to 2002 to 2006. The data for 200736 are interesting in their own right; 
however, management’s decision to cease operations was made public in early 2007. To 
eliminate any bias introduced by this information these observations are excluded from 
the sample. During the time period 2002-2006, the firm’s production totaled 7,977 
loans.37  Furthermore, because of the variation in mortgage pricing and omitted variable 
bias and the desire for a more homogenous sample, I limit the data to loans classified as 
“Agency” loans by FNMA or FHLMC.38  Agency loans are expected to have an identical 
default and prepayment risk. The two programs do not impose any interest rate adjust-
ment to the note rate as long as the customer is approved. Thus, an omitted variable such 
as income may disqualify a customer from the program; however, if a customer is ap-
proved, income does not affect the rate obtained.  
 Reducing the sample is assumed to eliminate any omitted variable bias that may 
exist from not having customer income data. Although income does not affect the interest 
rate the consumer qualifies for, it may be correlated with the consumer’s bargaining pow-
er. In the case that income is correlated with the consumer’s bargaining power and mar-
ket choice, omitted variable bias will still exist in this specification.  Specifically, if low 
income (or high debt-to-income) consumers are more likely to shop online and if bargain-
ing power increases with income, then the coefficients of the risk characteristics would be 
biased upwards in the online market.  For the purpose of this study, it is assumed that if 
any correlation exists, it is equal in both markets. Therefore the bias would be equal 
                                                 
36 The firm’s management announced on several occasions in 2007 that operations might end. Finally the 
company closed on August 31, 2007. 
37 I refer to this sample as the large sample in my discussion. 
38 I refer to this sample as the reduced sample in my discussion 
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across markets and will not jeopardize the analysis. The assumption is stringent and re-
mains a weakness in this study. 
  There are 3,368 completed transactions in the reduced sample. Summary statis-
tics for both samples are included in Table 4.2. Column 3 details the summary statistics 
for the large sample, and column 6 details the averages and variances of the reduced 
sample. Columns 1 and 2 compare the online and offline averages for the large sample, 
and columns 4 and 5 are for comparison of online and offline customers in the reduced 
sample. 
 The data consist of loan level observations. The individual variables included are: 
a loan type variable, and a variable indicating the consumer’s market choice. The only 
individual-level variable included in the dataset is the consumers’ middle credit score. 
There are three companies that report consumers’ credit scores: Experian, Equifax, and 
Transunion. The “middle” or median credit score is used for mortgage pricing and risk 
underwriting. The average credit score for all completed transactions (Column 3) is 
665,39 and the average credit score for the reduced sample was 10 points higher. 
 Loan-level variables include information on the type of loan- whether the loans 
are fixed rate or adjustable rate mortgages (ARM). The ratio of loan-to-home value 
(LTV) represents the amount of equity the consumer has accumulated in the property. 
The higher the loan-to-value, the lower the equity owned and the higher the presumed 
risk of default. The average observation in the reduced sample had a loan amount of 
$139,870 and a loan-to-value of 74%. 
                                                 
39 The national average credit score is 680. http://www.creditreport.com/info/credit-scores/average-credit-
scores.asp 
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 Included are dummy variables that specify whether the loan is a cash-out loan, 
purchase loan, or second-lien loan and a variable indicating the loan program. The varia-
ble “rate/term” is constructed using the dummy variables. If a loan is not a cash-out, pur-
chase, or second-lien then it is a rate/term refinance. Cash-out loans represent 54% of the 
loans originated during the sample period. Second-lien loans are classified as such be-
cause they are loans that place the mortgagor in second position to receive any funds 
from foreclosure or sale of the house. Rate/term refinancing is when customers refinance 
to take advantage of more favorable terms, such as adjusting the duration of the loan, or 
more likely to take advantage of lower interest rates in the market. Although all loans in 
the sample have identical risk premiums, consumer credit worthiness and loan types do 
vary. 
 Using the loan program, I construct a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 
for fixed loans and 0 for ARMs or home equity line of credit (HELOC). Fixed-rate loans 
account for 92%; this is a drastic variation from the larger sample where fixed loans ac-
counted for 62% of all loans. ARMs are usually associated with subprime loans, while 
government-insured loans are considered prime loans (Carrillo 2008). It is expected that 
ARM loans would be underrepresented in the reduced sample. 
 The market-choice variable “online” is equal to 1 if the consumer applied through 
an ICS site and 0 otherwise.40  In the sampling period ICS sites accounted for 70% of the 
firm’s business, and LendingTree accounted for 58% of the total business.  
                                                 
40 Each ICS has different practices about how many firms compete for each customer’s business. A more 
detailed examination of specific ICS practices and its impact on the average price and variances can further 
contribute to the search literature 
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 More information does reduce the dispersion of prices as predicted by search 
theory. The variance of Price in online markets is 1.41 compared with 1.52 for the retail 
consumers. Figure 4.2 shows the price dispersion for both markets using kernel densi-
ties.41 The mean and dispersion is smaller for online consumers. Table 4.3 provides 
summary statistics for online commerce by year and shows that consumers purchasing 
mortgages online paid less on average compared with offline consumers (Table 4.4). In 
contradiction to Bailey’s (1998)  hypothesis that the dispersion of prices would decrease 
with time and as more consumers used the internet, the variance of prices in both markets 
increased each year. Nonetheless, the variance of online prices is consistently lower than 
the variance of retail prices. 
 The reduced sample is representative of the large sample in most categories. The 
proportion of online and retail transactions remains unchanged. The reduced sample eli-
minates any heterogeneity due to subprime underwriting. Loans such as no income veri-
fication, stated income, and no income/no asset loans are not included because of the un-
observed pricing guidelines. However, by reducing the sample I am unable to analyze the 
search behavior and the pricing the non-conforming consumers pay.  
4.6 Results 
4.6.1 Price to the Consumer 
 The switching regression simultaneously estimates the probability of shopping 
online and the price that consumers pay for a mortgage. The estimation method is contin-
gent on joint normality of the error terms in the Probit and price equations. Given the hy-
                                                 
41 This is a subsample of the data which excludes second-lien loans and ARM products and includes only 
30-year loans. Figure 4.1 represents the reduced sample 
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pothesis developed by search theory, consumers’ search process is endogenous to mort-
gage prices observed. Search costs are unobserved but affect the consumer’s choice of 
market, and not controlling for this selection bias will affect the inference. Therefore, in-
cluding the inverse Mills ratio in the price equations will control for the selection process 
if it exists. 
   ࡱሾࡼ࢘࢏ࢉࢋ࢏࢕|ࡻሿ ൌ ࣂ࢕૚ ൅ ࢄ࢏ࣂ࢕૛ ൅ ࣌૚ࢿሺ
ࢌሺି࣐࢏ሻ
૚ିࡲሺି࣐ሻሻ
ሻ                     (4.15) 
   ࡱൣࡼ࢘࢏ࢉࢋ࢏ࢌหࢌ൧ ൌ ࣂࢌ૚ ൅ ࢄ࢏ࣂࢌ૛ െ ࣌૛ࢿሺ
ࢌሺି࣐࢏ሻ
ࡲሺି࣐ሻሻ
ሻ                           (4.16) 
    ࣎࢏ ൌ ࢾ૙ ൅ ࢾ૚ሺ࢖࢘࢏ࢉࢋ࢏ࢌ െ ࡼ࢘࢏ࢉࢋ࢏࢕ሻ ൅ ࢾ૛ࢄ࢏ ൅ ࢽ૜ࢆ࢏ ൅ ࣕ࢏           (4.17) 
 Results from the switching model are reported in Table 4.5. The exclusion varia-
ble Distance is positive and significant in the probability equation (reported in column 3). 
The distance of the property from the retail office is not expected to affect the price the 
consumer pays for a mortgage; however, distance is likely to affect consumers’ method 
of search. The predictive ability of distance supports its use as an exclusion restriction 
and will assist in identification. The variable measuring consumer education is negative, 
implying that individuals with higher education are less likely to use LendingTree or 
another ICS. The result is opposite of what is expected, where the hypothesis is that high-
er education levels are correlated with financial acumen and internet usage. Education is 
statistically insignificant and therefore it does not affect the probability of online com-
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merce. Since the majority of homeowners in today’s economy have a computer and 
access to the internet, internet usage and education are less likely to be correlated.42 
 All variables observed by loan officers during the application process are insigni-
ficant in the probit estimation. Credit score, loan amount, mortgage type (fixed or ARM), 
second-lien, and loan duration dummy variables are insignificant. Thus consumer and 
loan characteristics do not predict consumers’ search process. The variable Purchase is 
negative and significant. Thus we should expect customers to shop in the retail markets 
when purchasing a new home. Historically, most purchase transactions involve real estate 
agents; this finding reflects steering by the real estate agent towards local brokers and 
lenders. 
 The results of the estimation indicate there is a variation in the propensity to shop 
online throughout the years of the sample. Compared with the reference year in 2003, 
dummy-year effects are all positive and significant at the 5% level. In 2004, online com-
merce was more likely than in 2003; nonetheless, the magnitude of the coefficient de-
creases with time, possibly due to changes in taste. Alternatively, it may suggest that as 
demand for mortgages decreases from its height in 2004, online demand decreased more 
rapidly than retail demand. 
 The coefficients “rho1” and “rho2” report the correlation between the error in the 
market choice equation and the price equation errors. Both coefficients are statistically 
insignificant, which implies that consumers shopping in either market do not self select 
                                                 
42 The switching model fails to converge when including other exclusion restrictions such as distance 
squared and the average zip code income, which is a proxy for consumers’ income. Furthermore, I include 
Census information on consumer online shopping and computer ownership as exclusion restrictions, but the 
results are unchanged. 
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into the market type. Additionally, it indicates that the estimation method can be reduced 
to a grouped OLS estimation. The insignificance of the correlation coefficients implies 
that the propensity to shop online and the price equations are in fact not endogenous.  
 Table 4.6 provides the results for the grouped OLS estimation. Since endogeneity 
does not play a role, I can compare the coefficient estimates across groups. The predic-
tions of search theory suggest that consumers in the online market pay lower prices for 
each characteristic compared with the retail consumer. When testing if the coefficients 
are equal across price equations, I fail to reject that they are equal for 12 of the variables, 
including the constant term. If variables are equal across equations it implies that online 
and retail consumers pay equal prices for the loan features. Consequently consumer 
access to more information does not create a more competitive environment as theory 
would suggest. For loan duration variables, purchase loans, and the year 2006, there is a 
statistical difference in what online consumers paid compared with retail consumers. 
 In the online market, the firm is able to price discriminate with respect to the du-
ration of the loan. Loan-duration dummy variables are significant and increasing in loan 
maturity. Alternatively in the retail markets, loan duration does not impact the price the 
consumer pays. Relative to the reference category, 10-year loans, online consumers pay a 
premium for each additional 5 years up to 25 years. There is a 97-basis-point discount for 
consumers who obtain a 30-year mortgage compared with 25-year mortgages. Because of 
the increase in market power, online firms are able to discriminate with respect to loan 
types. The market power is eliminated in retail markets, where information asymmetries 
reduce the firm’s market power. In retail markets, the firm is uncertain about the consum-
82 
 
  
 
er search behavior and information set. The lack of information reduces the firm’s market 
power and allows increases the consumers bargaining power.   
 Consumers in search of a mortgage loan with the purpose of purchasing a home 
will pay 45 basis points more if they obtain their mortgage through an ICS site compared 
with what a retail consumer will pay. Most purchase transactions involve real estate 
agents, who usually have established relationships with mortgage brokers or lenders in 
their area. In an attempt to attract consumers of purchase loans, the firm made efforts to 
solicit and recruit local realtors. Therefore, search costs are lower in retail markets when 
a real estate assists the consumer. Moreover, the repeated interaction between realtor and 
lender is expected to reduce the prices realtor-assisted consumers pay. This is also re-
flected in the estimation of the propensity to shop online, where purchase consumers 
were less likely to search online. Therefore, if a consumer applies through an ICS site, 
they are signaling to the firms that neither they nor their realtor has a relationship with a 
local lender. Additionally, unlike a refinance loan, purchase loans have a specific closing 
date, and thus the consumer’s demand is less elastic. Firms are able to exert their market 
power on purchase consumers applying in online markets. The signal of high search 
costs, in addition to inelastic demand, allows the firm to price purchase loans higher in 
online markets than in retail markets. 
  With the exception of the dummy variable for 2006, all other year dummy va-
riables are not statistically different in both equations. Profits in 2006 decreased 47 basis 
points in online markets and 73 basis points in retail markets when compared with 2003. 
The reduction in profits per loan may be capturing the decrease in demand for mortgages 
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as housing prices began to decline. An alternative hypothesis is the assumption that the 
firm acquires its capital at a constant K may not be accurate. The firm may have been 
able to reduce its cost of capital by becoming a mortgage banker and consequently trans-
ferring the lower costs to the consumer.43 Nonetheless the retail consumers paid lower 
prices in 2006 compared with online consumers, when controlling for all other variables. 
When comparing the coefficients for the year 2004, I cannot reject that in both the retail 
and online markets prices remained similar to 2003. Consequently, the change in Len-
dingTree policy did not affect the firms’ pricing strategies. Increasing the number of 
firms competing for each consumer from four to five did not have an effect on prices.  
 It is possible to conclude that the number of competing firms and the bidding en-
vironment created by LendingTree and other ICS firms has not reduced the average price 
of mortgages. The ability of consumers to observe multiple offers does not create more of 
a competitive environment as compared with markets where the consumer observes a 
single price per search. On average, prices are equal in both markets. The benefits of the 
reduction in search costs are apparently offset by the anticompetitive environment the 
gatekeeper provides.  For some loan programs and types, the anticompetitive effect is 
larger and online consumers pay higher prices than the retail consumer. The results are 
unchanged when the sample is restricted to an even more homogenous product.44   
 An alternative explanation for the higher prices in online markets can be attri-
buted to the gatekeeper fees. The fees charged to the firm by the gatekeeper increase the 
                                                 
43 A mortgage lender uses its own funds to supply loans, whereas a broker must use other firms’ funds. By 
becoming a lender, the firm has access to a lower cost of capital. 
44 I exclude second-lien loans and ARM products to generate a homogenous sample of mortgages. When 
the sample includes only fixed loans that are in the first-lien position, the results are unchanged. 
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cost of online loans. Consequently, even if prices are equal to marginal cost of production 
in the online market, the higher marginal cost would cause online prices to be higher rela-
tive to retail markets. Therefore testing for differences in profits would assist in either 
supporting or eliminating marginal cost variations as the reason for higher online prices. 
If online profits are larger than retail profits, then the hypothesis of the existence of an 
anti-competitive effect would be supported.   
 As suggested by Brown and Goolsbee (2002) , the possibility exists that the in-
ception of ICS has caused a reduction in all market prices. Consequently, informed con-
sumers and ignorant consumers pay lower prices after the internet compared with before 
the internet. Since the mortgage data starts in 2002, well after the establishment of the 
internet, it is not possible to test this hypothesis. However, this implies that all coeffi-
cients should be statistically equal, which is not evident in the results. 
4.6.2 Robustness Check 
 The switching model uses the FIML, which is contingent on the normality of the 
error terms. Alternatively, the Heckman 2SLS uses a LIML in the estimation process; 
however, the tradeoff is in the form of efficiency. The estimation procedure is less oner-
ous compared with the FIML and more likely to meet the convergence criteria. The 
FIML specification estimated requires at least one exclusion restriction for identification. 
To test whether the estimation is sensitive to the exclusion restriction, I include distance 
squared and zip code income as other instruments. However, the FIML does not converge 
when the other exclusion restrictions are included. Thus, I test whether the switching 
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model is sensitive to the exclusion restrictions and normality of the error term by compar-
ing the Heckman 2SLS with the switching results.  
 Table 4.7 provides the estimation results for online and offline pricing. Column 1 
provides the results for the pricing equation when all exclusion restrictions are included.  
Column 2 includes only the exclusion restrictions from the switching model. Comparing 
across the Heckman 2SLS specification, the coefficients are similar and maintain their 
significance; therefore, the specification is robust with regard to the exclusion restrictions 
and the specification does not suffer from weak instrumental variable bias. Comparing 
the results from the Heckman 2SLS and the switching regression with identical exclusion 
restriction, the results are unchanged. Consequently, the results derived from the switch-
ing model are not sensitive to the assumption of normality of the errors or the choice of 
exclusion restrictions. Therefore, I can eliminate the possibility of selection and endo-
geneity between market choice and mortgage prices. 
 Blinder-Oaxaca (1973) decomposition is often used in labor economics to study 
wage differentials by group. The analysis separates the difference in wages into explained 
and unexplained portions. Other fields of economics have also used the decomposition to 
explain differences between groups. In this research it is possible to use the method to 
separate the difference in interest rate into explained and unexplained parts. 
 Using the results from the pooled OLS estimation, I conduct the Oaxaca decom-
position proposed by Neumark (1988). The decomposition in equation 4.18 measures the 
difference in prices between the retail and online markets. It assumes that there is a stan-
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dard price ߚ that should prevail and allows prices in both the retail and online market to 
deviate from the “true” price.  
  ࡼ࢘࢏ࢉࢋࢌ െ ࡼ࢘࢏ࢉࢋ࢕ ൌ ࢼ൫ࢄࢌ െ ࢄ࢕൯ െ ൫ࢼࢌ െ ࢼ൯ࢄࢌ ൅ ሺࢼ࢕ െ ࢼሻࢄ࢕           (4.18) 
The first term in the decomposition is interpreted as the difference in price due to differ-
ences in characteristics. The next two terms represent the difference in price due to prefe-
rential treatment. If the “true” price is assumed to exist in the retail market, that is ߚ௙ ൌ 
ߚ, then the Neumark decomposition simplifies to the Oaxaca decomposition. Thus, the 
Oaxaca decomposition is a specific case which can be derived from the general format 
represented in equation 4.18 (Neumark, 1988).  
 
0 ൌ 0.00 ൅ 0.5 െ 0.5 
 The results indicate that on average online consumers and retail consumers pay 
the same price for a mortgage. The result of the decomposition suggests there are no dif-
ferences between group observables and therefore characteristics do not affect the price. 
The second and third terms indicate that the differences in online and retail markets are 
solely due to differences in the coefficients. In fact, the average retail consumer would 
increase their rate by 50 basis points if they were to shop online. Alternatively, a con-
sumer shopping online would reduce their price by 50 basis points if they shopped in re-
tail markets. The consumer characteristics are similar between groups and the variation in 
prices is due to the market structure. Therefore, market structure in the online market 
provides the firm with ability to price discriminate in terms of consumer characteristics. 
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4.6.3 Profits to the Firm 
 The analysis thus far has established that online consumers pay a higher price 
compared to the retail consumer. However, online consumers may be receiving higher 
prices due to the fee which is charged by the gatekeeper. To fully examine the profits in 
online markets I must account for the variation in marginal cost and the gatekeeper fee. 
Thus, I create a new APR measure that excludes the gatekeeper fee for online loans, 
where the new dependent variable will measure the profits the firm receives.45 For retail 
operations the revenue the firm receives is the profit to the firm because the firm does not 
have to pay any additional cost. Therefore in retail operations, the firm retains all reve-
nue, while online operations have a higher cost of originating the loan and it must be ac-
counted for.  
 To estimate the profit equation I use a grouped OLS method, and compare the 
coefficients across markets. If the coefficients are equal across markets it indicates that 
the consumer receives a higher price due to the higher marginal cost imposed by the ga-
tekeeper and profits are equal in both markets. Alternatively, if the coefficients are higher 
(lower), then that suggests that firms make higher (lower) profits in the presence of a ga-
tekeeper. If the profits are higher in online markets, the presence of the gatekeeper in-
creases the anticompetitive effect. Alternatively, if the firm receives lower profits in on-
line markets compared to the retail market that suggests that the online market is more 
competitive.  
                                                 
45 See Appendix for method of calculating the APR 
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 The results of the profit equations are reported in Table 4.8. After controlling for 
the variation in marginal costs, I find that the presence of the gatekeeper creates both a 
search cost effect and an anticompetitive effect depending on the market segment. On 
average the profits to the firm are equal across market type, and thus the anticompetitive 
effect and search cost effect are equal and offset each other. For fixed loans and loans 
originated in 2004, the search cost effect dominates the anti-competitive effect. The firm 
received lower profits in online transactions with LendingTree compared to retail transac-
tions. 
 For loans originated in 2006, Purchase loans, and Loan Duration variables, the 
Firm received higher profits in the online market compared to the retail market. Conse-
quently, for those market segments, the anti-competitive effect dominates the search cost 
effect. The presence of the gatekeeper and information presents firms the opportunity to 
tacitly collude and increases their market power. Alternatively, the results suggest that the 
gatekeeper ‘s pricing strategy can be adjusted to extract more profits from the firms. The 
gatekeeper can increase its profits by increasing fees on loans originated in 2006, pur-
chase loans, and for the loan duration variables. 
4.7 Conclusion 
 In this research I have examined the effects of the internet and ICS such as Len-
dingTree on market prices and firm profits. Economic theory predicts that ICS sites help 
lower search costs and will increase consumption of information by the consumer. As 
consumers become aware of the price distribution in the economy, they are able to 
choose the lowest-priced firm. Therefore, the introduction of online markets is expected 
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to cause a reduction in prices. However, I examine another effect of online markets, 
which I call the anticompetitive effect. Online markets with a gatekeeper that limits the 
amount of information the consumer receives provide firms with market power that is not 
observed in retail markets.  
 I test my hypothesis by examining firm profits and whether informed consumers 
(online consumers) pay lower prices for mortgage products than uninformed consumers 
(retail consumers). Mortgage pricing varies across lenders and consumer risk characteris-
tics, and therefore I establish an approach to eliminate the heterogeneity in mortgage 
products. I restrict my analysis to a subset of mortgages with identical default and pre-
payment risk. After controlling for the macroeconomic environment and eliminating any 
bias due to omitted underwriting variables, I am able to examine the differences in prices 
paid between online and retail consumers. I use a switching regression to control for con-
sumers’ endogenous market choice, and I find that consumers searching for mortgages in 
online markets do not pay a lower price compared with consumers searching in a retail 
markets. Additionally, I do not find any supporting evidence that consumers select into 
market types as a result of unobserved characteristics. 
 I find that online markets provide the firm with the ability to price discriminate by 
loan characteristics. Contrary to the theory, some consumers may end up paying higher 
rates by applying for a mortgage in the online market. I conclude that this is evidence of 
tacit collusion behavior in online markets. Online markets make information accessible 
and provide the member firms with market power and the ability to monitor their compet-
itors. Although the retail consumer has a higher search cost, they pay equal or lower pric-
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es compared with the online consumer. Because of the uncertainty about the retail con-
sumers’ information, firms are forced to consider the possibility that the consumers may 
have already observed a low price. To the extent that this occurs, the prices in retail mar-
kets will be lower than prices in online markets. When consumers apply through an ICS 
site, the firm has information about its immediate competitors and the expected price dis-
tribution the consumer will observe; consequently, it can charge higher price for its prod-
uct.  
 To examine firm profits, I control for the marginal cost variation across market 
types. The gatekeeper fees increase the marginal cost in online markets, and the variation 
in prices may be due to variation in the cost structure. When controlling for the higher 
marginal cost imposed by the gatekeeper, I find that for a segment of the market the firm 
receives higher profits in the online market. This provides further support that online 
markets create an anti-competitive market. For some market segments online profits are 
lower when compared to the retail profits, and in this case the presence of the gatekeeper 
increases the competitive environment. Nonetheless, on average, profits in online markets 
are equal to the profits in retail markets.  
 The threat of competition in retail markets is more severe than the actual competi-
tion in the online market. Empirical literature examining the effects of the internet on 
pricing should carefully consider the market structure, especially in the presence of a ga-
tekeeper. The anticompetitive effect can be equal or larger than the search cost effect. 
This may help explain why empirical research focusing on the benefits of the internet has 
been inconclusive. 
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Appendix 
Calculating APR for the consumer (Price paid) 
ܮܣ െ ܥ ൌ ܲ ቈ
ሺ1 ൅ ܽ݌ݎሻ௠ െ 1
ݎሺ1 ൅ ܽ݌ݎሻ௠
቉ 
Where: 
LA= Loan Amount at origination 
C=Commission paid to the Loan Officer 
P= Monthly payment 
m= the total duration of the loan in months (30 year loan will have 360 monthly pay-
ments) 
APR= the annual percentage rate and the variable to solve for. Solving for the APR pro-
vides the true price of the loan (in percentage points) to the consumer after controlling for 
the commission. 
 
Calculating the APR for the firm (Profits received) 
 
ܮܣ െ ሺܥ െ ܨ݁݁ሻ ൌ ܲ ቈ
ሺ1 ൅ ܽ݌ݎሻ௠ െ 1
ݎሺ1 ൅ ܽ݌ݎሻ௠
቉ 
Where: 
Fee= the fees paid to the gatekeeper. Solving for APR will provide the profits (in percen-
tage points) the firm receives for each loan after paying the cost to the gatekeeper. 
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   Figure 4.1: Price Paid by Online and Offline Consumers.  30 Year Fixed Mortgages Only. 
Kernal densities of the price consumers pay for a mortgage. Source: Firm data. 
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Figure 4.2: Price Paid by Online and Offline Consumers. All Loans 
Source: Firm data 
 
Figure 4.3: Number of Loans Originated by State and Market Type. 
Source: Firm data 
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Table 4.1: Default and Prepayment Variables 
Variable Explanation 
Expense to Income  Housing payment/Gross Income 
Debt to Income Total Debt Payments/Gross Income 
Net Worth Savings & stock Accounts, Retirement Accounts, Home Equity 
(Second Homes, Investment properties) 
Employment History Stability of Employment 
Loan to Value Loan Amount/House value (Equity invested in the house)   
Fixed Loan Fixed interest rate 
Adjustable Rate Mortgage 
(ARM) 
Loans with variable interest rate 
Term of Loan  Loan Duration10,15,20, 25, 30,or 40 years 
Loan Amount Loan Amount 
Credit Score A measure of consumer credit worthiness 
Lien Position In the case of foreclosure or sale of the house, the lien position 
determines who receives funds first. It is important in the where 
sale or foreclosure proceeds are less than total mortgage debt 
outstanding. 
Refinance Type Rate and Term, or Cashout 
Purchase Loans made to finance a purchase of a home 
Liquid Assets Savings and stock accounts 
Bankruptcy A recent bankruptcy would impact the creditworthiness 
Foreclosure Foreclosure on a property would impact the creditworthiness of 
the consumer 
Prepayment Penalty Most states allow the lender to impose a prepayment penalty on 
mortgage for a specific time frame. Usually it ranges from 1-5 
years and the penalty can range from 1-9% of the loan amount. 
They are designed to discourage early prepayment. Usually 
associated with subprime loans. Agency loans do not have pre-
payment penalties.  
APR Annual percentage rate. Measures the cost of a loan including 
all transaction fees. 
EAPR The APR minus the 10 year Treasury. Measures the real risk of 
a loan.  
Conforming A loan that confirms to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac guide-
lines. 
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Table  4.2 : Summary Statistics for Large and Reduced Samples 
 Large Sample Reduced Sample 
Dependent Vari-
able 
(1) 
Online 
(2) 
Retail 
(3) 
Average 
(4) 
Online 
(5) 
Retail 
(6) 
Average 
Rate 6.98 
(1.67) 
6.84 
(1.73) 
6.94 6.33 6.31 6.32 
 (1.69) (1.36) (1.48) (1.40) 
Commission 1375.79 1091.03 1293.03 1330.89 951.77 1216.28 
 (1302.60) (1446.87) (1352.02) (1157.16) (1181.36) (1177.11) 
APR 7.17 7.01 7.13 6.51 6.46 6.49 
 (1.72) (1.80) (1.75) (1.40) (1.53) (1.44) 
EAPR 2.77 2.70 2.75 2.14 2.21 2.16 
 (1.72) (1.75) (1.73) (1.41) (1.52) (1.44) 
ICS Fee 600.47 0.00 426.47 601.27 0.00 420.32 
 (286.98) 0.00 (364.28) (282.46) 0.00 (363.11) 
Credit score 663.16 672.79 665.97 672.62 681.53 675.34 
 (62.39) (67.50) (64.06) (58.51) (63.66) (60.24) 
Loan To Value 76.16 72.38 75.06 74.88 71.89 73.96 
 (24.92) (27.65) (25.80) (24.30) (25.97) (24.86) 
Loan amount 135.78 130.28 134.20 142.10 134.59 139.87 
(1,000) (91.50) (92.59) (91.85) (80.17) (74.88) (78.71) 
Fixed 0.63 0.62 0.62 0.94 0.92 0.93 
 (0.48) (0.49) (0.48) (0.25) (0.27) (0.26) 
Conforming 0.42 0.44 0.42 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 (0.49) (0.50) (0.49) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Cash Out 0.58 0.39 0.53 0.61 0.39 0.54 
 (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) 
Purchase 0.14 0.35 0.20 0.11 0.32 0.17 
 (0.34) (0.48) (0.40) (0.31) (0.47) (0.38) 
Second 0.16 0.22 0.18 0.13 0.17 0.14 
 (0.36) (0.42) (0.38) (0.34) (0.38) (0.35) 
term10 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 
 (0.17) (0.20) (0.18) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) 
term15 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.15 0.14 0.15 
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) 
term20 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.08 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) 
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Table 4.2 Continued      
term25 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
term30 0.81 0.80 0.81 0.74 0.74 0.74 
 (0.39) (0.40) (0.39) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) 
term40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
YR2002 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.11 0.03 
 0.00 (0.28) (0.15) 0.00 (0.31) (0.18) 
YR2003 0.09 0.20 0.12 0.11 0.25 0.15 
 (0.28) (0.40) (0.32) (0.31) (0.43) (0.36) 
YR2004 0.27 0.16 0.24 0.30 0.16 0.26 
 (0.45) (0.37) (0.43) (0.46) (0.37) (0.44) 
YR2005 0.40 0.34 0.38 0.40 0.33 0.38 
 (0.49) (0.47) (0.49) (0.49) (0.47) (0.49) 
YR2006 0.24 0.22 0.23 0.19 0.15 0.18 
 (0.43) (0.42) (0.42) (0.39) (0.36) (0.38) 
Education 10.10 10.22 10.13 10.09 10.24 10.13 
 (2.19) (2.35) (2.24) (2.24) (2.39) (2.29) 
Income 58935.55 59370.39 59070.88 58628.16 59180.93 58816.78 
 (18651.99) (18657.30) (18666.83) (18572.90) (18669.57) (18633.24) 
Distance 422.39 294.78 385.36 420.98 265.75 374.14 
 (321.52) (327.35) (328.33) (338.39) (318.80) (340.06) 
Obs 5664 2311 7977 2353 1013 3368 
Standard deviations in parentheses 
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Table 4.3:  Online Consumer Summary Statistics by Year (Conforming Loans only) 
Variable 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total Online 
Credit score . 668.4572 670.5787 676.4926 670.3322 672.6741 
 (.) (59.7745) (56.2547) (59.2812) (59.4917) (58.5267) 
Rate  . 6.1945 6.3518 6.3427 6.3399 6.3288 
 (.) (1.0133) (1.4466) (1.3924) (1.3294) (1.3615) 
APR . 6.358 6.5337 6.5153 6.5442 6.5091 
 (.) (1.0478) (1.4837) (1.4224) (1.3861) (1.3992) 
EAPR . 2.2022 2.2644 2.2298 1.7296 2.1435 
 (.) (1.0327) (1.475) (1.4219) (1.3716) (1.4055) 
Loan To Value . 73.3411 71.2297 75.2852 80.6216 74.8475 
 (.) (21.5715) (24.5767) (26.0623) (20.0747) (24.3185) 
Loan amount  . 141.1411 137.3732 145.9184 142.3318 142.1419 
($1000) (.) (76.2235) (72.0773) (85.959) (81.9793) (80.206) 
Upfront Fee . 1407.655 1318.878 1303.765 1359.193 1330.051 
 (.) (1246.57) (1088.211) (1188.352) (1144.159) (1157.067) 
Fixed  . .9572 .9298 .9365 .9252 .9346 
 (.) (.2028) (.2557) (.244) (.2634) (.2473) 
Cash out  . .6537 .6362 .5894 .5918 .611 
 (.) (.4767) (.4814) (.4922) (.4921) (.4876) 
Purchase . .0467 .1124 .127 .093 .1074 
 (.) (.2114) (.316) (.3331) (.2907) (.3097) 
Second  . .0389 .1067  .1524 .1927 .1338 
 (.) (.1938) (.309) (.3596) (.3949) (.3405) 
ICS Fee . 560.625 615.9494 611.6772 578.8889 601.2686 
 (.) (279.2546) (291.8635) (279.3189) (272.7866) (282.4647) 
Distance  . 408.1278 425.851 426.2261 408.24 420.7695 
 (.) (314.3184) (329.1149) (367.064) (300.8934) (338.3507) 
term10  . .0272 .0225 .0212 .0227 .0225 
 (.) (.1631) (.1483) (.144) (.149) (.1484) 
term15  . .1907 .1545 .1333 .1406 .1473 
 (.) (.3936) (.3617) (.3401) (.348) (.3545) 
term20 . .0817 .0955 .0825 .0703 .0841 
 (.) (.2745) (.2941) (.2753) (.2559) (.2776) 
term25 . .0078 .0042 .0127 .0045 .0081 
 (.) (.088) (.0648) (.112) (.0673) (.0895) 
term30 . .6926 .7233 .7503 .7619 .738 
 (.) (.4623) (.4477) (.4331) (.4264) (.4398) 
term40 . 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
AHI . 57286.02 58738.48 59352.16 57851.2 58660.01 
 (.) (17195.32) (18146.97) (19085.89) (19135.45) (18619.35) 
Education  . 10.0185 10.0428 10.1671 10.0377 10.0891 
 (.) (2.1805) (2.2095) (2.2887) (2.2277) (2.2414) 
Observations 0 257 712 945 441 2355 
Standard deviations in parentheses 
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Table 4.4 : Offline Consumer Summary Statistics by Year (Conforming Loans only) 
Variable 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total Of-
fline 
Credit score  694.32  687.9602 683.5 676.5714 671.3799 681.6429 
 (64.80) (62.7149) (63.5518) (63.456) (63.0511) (63.6622) 
Rate  6.05  6.1326 6.3911 6.4817 6.2832 6.3042 
 (1.02) (1.2798) (1.6868) (1.702) (1.2535) (1.481) 
APR 6.18  6.2789 6.5549 6.631 6.4675 6.4581 
   (1.10) (1.3183) (1.7382) (1.7638) (1.2791) (1.532) 
EAPR 2.12  2.3187 2.2763 2.3737 1.6698 2.2103 
 (1.06) (1.3174) (1.7115) (1.7171) (1.2994) (1.5186) 
LTV 70.16  70.0321 68.7876 71.2974 80.2708 71.8217 
 (20.30) (22.0907) (28.8535) (29.3977) (22.7995) (26.0018) 
Loan amount 135.48  131.0411 135.8228 134.6435 139.0619 134.7046 
($1,000) (67.24) (71.4039) (85.8955) (74.9377) (74.3307) (74.9965) 
Commission  671.47  806.5239 876.1493 1040.21 1268.448 950.5802 
 (1157.21) (1316.279) (1137.503) (1085.387) (1131.018) (1180.603) 
Fixed  0.91  .9402 .8902 .9107 .9286 .9172 
 (0.29) (.2375) (.3135) (.2856) (.2584) (.2757) 
Cash out 0.35  .3705 .3963 .3929 .4091 .3852 
 (0.48) (.4839) (.4906) (.4891) (.4933) (.4869) 
Purchase  0.06  .1315 .4268 .4286 .4481 .3182 
 (0.25) (.3386) (.4961) (.4956) (.4989) (.466) 
Second  0.05  .0558 .1951 .2262 .2922 .1695 
 (0.21) (.2299) (.3975) (.419) (.4563) (.3753) 
Distance  140.69  173.1625 284.7453 338.6992 325.4575 265.5781 
 (234.41) (268.8194) (294.1475) (370.8595) (284.8075) (318.5766) 
term10  0.03  .0438 .0183 .0208 .0195 .0266 
 (0.16) (.2051) (.1344) (.143) (.1387) (.161) 
term15 0.11  .1514 .1524 .125 .1753 .1419 
 (0.31) (.3591) (.3605) (.3312) (.3815) (.3491) 
term20 0.13  .1155 .0854 .0595 .0455 .0828 
 (0.33) (.3203) (.2803) (.237) (.209) (.2757) 
term25 0.04  .004 0 .0119 0 .0089 
 (0.19) (.0631) (0) (.1086) (0) (.0938) 
term30 0.70  .6853 .7439 .7827 .7597 .7399 
 (0.46) (.4653) (.4378) (.413) (.4286) (.4389) 
term40 0.00  0 0 0 0 0 
 0.00  (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
AHI 60411.15  59692.48 58553.74 58811.79 59421.17 59253.67 
 (19848.82) (18925.8) (18489.75) (18478.73) (18865.3) (18774.16) 
education 10.42  10.2691 10.4027 10.1396 10.1507 10.2462 
 (2.57) (2.4977) (2.3268) (2.3044) (2.3539) (2.3915) 
Obs 694.32  251 164 336 154 1015 
Standard deviations in parentheses 
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Table  4.5: Switching Regression 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) 
EAPR  EAPR Probit 
Online Offline Online 
Credit Score -0.0055* -.0055* -0.000795 
12.57 7.98 1.93 
Loan Amount -0.0051* -.0061* 0.0038 
15.66 10.38 1.09 
Fixed 1.1661* 1.286* 0.134349 
11.18 8.13 1.38 
30 yr term .8038* .628* -0.0457 
4.68 2.55 0.28 
25 yr term 1.774* 0.0498 0.1297 
5.42 0.1 0.42 
20 yr term .7848* 0.4961 0.046 
4.15 1.69 0.25 
15 yr term 0.2566 -0.011 -0.00778 
1.42 0.04 0.04 
Loan To Value -0.0000916 0.0025 .00295* 
0.08 1.26 2.6 
Cash out 0.0739 0.0192 .1589* 
1.27 0.17 2.68 
Purchase .5294* -0.0054 -0.897* 
5.22 0.03 12.04 
Second 0.1117 0.19 -0.126 
1.28 1.39 1.57 
Coverage Law -0.0079 -0.0339 -0.0617* 
0.49 1.03 3.62 
Enforcement Law -0.0139 -0.011 -0.1131* 
0.8 0.29 6.39 
2006 -.5548* -.6757* .9193* 
5.19 3.53 11.04 
2005 -0.0413 0.0657 .9441* 
0.42 0.38 13.56 
2004 -0.638 0.0801 1.199* 
0.62 0.37 15.54 
Distance 0.0045* 
5.04 
Education -0.016 
1.36 
Constant 4.922* 5.093* 0.5066 
12.65 7.62 1.32 
/lns1 and /lns2 0.2005* 0.2818592* 
13.12 11.89 
/r1 and /r2 -0.139 0.079 
-1.89 0.49 
Sigma  1.22* 1.33* 
0.0187˟ 0.0314˟ 
Rho1 and Rho2  -0.138 0.0787 
LR test of Indep Eqns                  chi2(1)=7.35            Prob>chi2=0.0067 
˟standard error 
*significant at the 5% level 
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Table 4.6: OLS Price Estimation 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Online Price Equation Off Price Equation 
Credit score -0.006 -0.005 
 (12.78)** (8.01)** 
Loan amount -0.005 -0.006 
 (15.55)** (10.37)** 
Fixed  1.177 1.274 
 (11.27)** (8.10)** 
term30 0.803 0.672 
 (4.67)** (2.53)* 
term25♠ 1.790 0.041 
 (5.47)** (0.08) 
term20♠ 0.789 0.493 
 (4.17)** (1.66) 
term15♠ 0.257 -0.013 
 (1.42) (0.05) 
LTV 0.000 0.002 
 (0.11) (1.19) 
Cash out 0.086 0.005 
 (1.48) (0.04) 
Purchase ♠ 0.450 0.054 
 (4.86)** (0.45) 
Second  0.101 0.200 
 (1.16) (1.47) 
Coverage law  -0.012 -0.029 
 (0.76) (0.92) 
Enforcement law -0.023 0.001 
 (1.42) (0.02) 
YR2006♠ -0.474 -0.738 
 (4.82)** (5.10)** 
YR2005 0.041 0.000 
 (0.47) (0.00) 
YR2004 0.034 -0.003 
 (0.38) (0.02) 
Constant 4.832 4.949 
 (12.51)** (8.16)** 
Observations 2351 1010 
R-squared 0.25 0.24 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
♠ indicates coefficients are not equal across equations 
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Table  4.7: Results Using Heckman Selection and Exclusion Restriction Tests 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 All exclusion 
Online 
Price Eq 
All exclusion Online 
Probit 
switching  
exclusion 
Online 
Price 
switching exclu-
sion Online 
Probit 
All exclusion 
Offline 
Price Eq. 
All exclusion 
Offline 
Probit 
switching 
exclusion 
Offline 
Price Eq 
switching 
exclusion 
Offline 
Probit 
Credit  
Score 
-0.005 -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 -0.005 0.001 -0.006  
 (9.74)** (1.67) (9.32)** (1.92) (7.50)** (1.62) (7.59)** (1.88) 
Loan -0.005 0.000 -0.005 0.000 -0.006 -0.000 -0.006 -0.000 
Amount (14.24)** (0.94) (13.86)** (1.24) (10.19)** (0.95) (9.81)** (1.28) 
Fixed  1.099 0.138 1.085 0.135 1.271 -0.128 1.305 -0.125 
 (9.23)** (1.41) (8.88)** (1.39) (7.86)** (1.31) (7.98)** (1.29) 
term30  0.814 -0.050 0.807 -0.049 0.671 0.047 0.674 0.048 
 (4.19)** (0.30) (4.07)** (0.30) (2.55)* (0.29) (2.54)* (0.29) 
term25 1.677 0.112 1.658 0.139 0.037 -0.112 0.069 -0.139 
 (4.52)** (0.36) (4.37)** (0.44) (0.07) (0.36) (0.13) (0.45) 
term20 0.758 0.039 0.749 0.038 0.491 -0.040 0.501 -0.038 
 (3.53)** (0.21) (3.42)** (0.21) (1.67) (0.22) (1.69) (0.21) 
term15 0.249 -0.011 0.242 -0.011 -0.014 0.009 -0.006 0.010 
 (1.22) (0.06) (1.16) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) 
LTV -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.003 0.002 -0.003 0.003 -0.003 
 (1.14) (2.52)* (1.24) (2.62)** (1.13) (2.45)* (1.34) (2.54)* 
Cash out -0.012 0.153 -0.021 0.158 0.000 -0.152 0.044 -0.156 
 (0.18) (2.58)** (0.29) (2.67)** (0.00) (2.55)* (0.36) (2.64)** 
Purchase  1.083 -0.897 1.136 -0.896 0.074 0.896 -0.113 0.895 
 (6.11)** (12.03)** (5.61)** (12.04)** (0.30) (12.02)** (0.41) (12.04)** 
Second 0.187 -0.135 0.195 -0.125 0.203 0.139 0.171 0.129 
 (1.88) (1.68) (1.91) (1.55) (1.45) (1.73) (1.20) (1.61) 
Coverage  0.022 -0.058 0.026 -0.061 -0.027 0.058 -0.043 0.062 
Law (1.09) (3.39)** (1.22) (3.60)** (0.75) (3.42)** (1.14) (3.63)** 
Enforcement  0.053 -0.086 0.062 -0.113 0.005 0.086 -0.031 0.113 
Law (1.99)* (4.55)** (2.09)* (6.43)** (0.09) (4.57)** (0.56) (6.45)** 
YR2006 -1.115 0.900 -1.181 0.920 -0.759 -0.898 -0.562 -0.917 
 (6.02)** (10.77)** (5.55)** (11.05)** (2.83)** (10.75)** (1.88) (11.02)** 
YR2005 -0.613 0.939 -0.677 0.944 -0.022 -0.935 0.184 -0.941 
 (3.40)** (13.44)** (3.24)** (13.56)** (0.08) (13.40)** (0.62) (13.53)** 
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Table 4.7 Continued 
 
       
YR2004 -0.748 1.180 -0.824 1.195 -0.030 -1.178 0.229 -1.193 
 (3.59)** (15.26)** (3.39)** (15.51)** (0.09) (15.25)** (0.62) (15.50)** 
Distance  0.001  0.000  -0.001  -0.000 
  (5.99)**  (4.91)**  (5.96)**  (4.87)** 
        
distance2  -0.000    0.000   
  (4.16)**    (4.14)**   
AHI  0.000    -0.000   
  (1.31)    (1.41)   
Education  -0.033  -0.016  0.033  0.016 
  (1.84)  (1.41)  (1.88)  (1.36) 
Constant 5.545 0.265 5.625 0.508 4.902 -0.268 5.350 -0.512 
 (11.91)** (0.68) (11.56)** (1.33) (6.20)** (0.69) (6.30)** (1.33) 
Observa-
tions 
3358 3358 3359 3359 3360 3360 3361 3361 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table  4.8: OLS Profit Estimation 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Online Price Equation Off Price Equation 
Credit score -0.004 -0.001 
 (9.61)** (8.01)** 
Loan amount -0.01 -0.01 
 (13.97) (10.37)** 
Fixed ♠ .911 1.27 
 (8.27)** (8.10)** 
term30♠ .98 0.67 
 (5.42)** (2.53)* 
term25♠ 2.27 0.04 
 (6.53)** (0.08) 
term20♠ 1.895 0.49 
 (9.43)** (1.66) 
term15♠ 2.24 -0.01 
 (11.72)** (0.05) 
LTV 0 0 
 (0.61) (1.19) 
Cash out 0.12 0.01 
 (2.00)** (0.04) 
Purchase ♠ .237 0.05 
 (2.42) (0.45) 
Second  .032 0.2 
 (0.36) (1.47) 
Coverage law  -0.029 -0.03 
 (1.70) (0.92) 
Enforcement law -0.052 0 
 (2.98)** (0.02) 
YR2006♠ 0.075 -0.74 
 (0.79)** (5.10)** 
YR2005 0.062 0 
 (0.67) (0.0) 
YR2004♠ -0.425 0 
 (4.08)** (0.02) 
Constant 4.80 4.95 
 (11.74)** (8.16)** 
Observations 2351 1010 
R-squared 0.29 .24 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
♠ indicates coefficients are not equal across equations 
 
  
 
5. CHAPTER 5. Asymmetric Information and the Lemons Problem in Mortgage 
Banking 
5.1 Introduction 
 The literature investigating asymmetric information in the mortgage market has 
mainly been concerned with principal-agent problems that arise during the process of se-
curitization. Lenders supplying mortgage loans to the secondary market are relatively 
more informed about the quality of the underlying collateral. Specifically, the lender is 
more informed about the probability of default or prepayment associated with each loan 
than are potential buyers of the loan in the secondary market. Since the value of an asset 
is the discounted value of the future stream of income, information about the probability 
of default or prepayment is valuable to the secondary market and in order to accurately 
price the asset.  
 The described securitization process would predict a lemons market outcome, as 
suggested by Akerloff (1970). This occurs because lenders possess more accurate infor-
mation about the true quality of each loan, while demanders of loans only identify the 
distribution of overall quality. As a result of the information asymmetries, the lemons 
problem would predict that lenders will sell the low quality loans to the secondary market 
and retain the least risky (high quality) loans on their own balance sheets.  The outcome 
of the lemons problem would suggest that the behavior of agents could lead to a collapse 
of the Mortgage Backed Securities market.  
 Demanders of mortgage loans would expect that the mortgages supplied to the 
secondary loan market to be of low quality. However, in 2004, 65% of all originated 
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loans were repackaged as Mortgage Backed Securities, creating a total of $1.85 trillion of 
bonds.46 The volume of activity in the Mortgage Backed Securities market would suggest 
the presence of a vibrant market despite the existence of asymmetric information. This 
leads to a postulation that other market factors exist which encourage lenders to supply 
mortgages to the secondary market, or that market mechanisms have been developed to 
mitigate the lemons problem. 
 In this chapter, I test for the presence of asymmetric information in the mortgage 
market. Using the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, I examine pricing variations between 
the broker and lender segments of the mortgage market.  The decomposition allows the 
separation of any difference in price into explained and unexplained differences. The un-
explained difference is a measure of asymmetric information. I do not find any evidence 
of asymmetric information or sorting behavior in the mortgage market.   
5.2 Literature 
5.2.1 Lemons Market 
 The lemons problem, as described in Akerloff (1970), exists in markets where the 
quality of a good varies and some market participants have imperfect information. Spe-
cifically, when sellers know the true quality of their product but buyers only know the 
distribution of overall quality in the market. Buyers entering the market must infer the 
quality of the product being sold. Any buyer’s best estimate of quality would be the mar-
ket’s average quality for that product. Since price does not reflect the true quality of the 
                                                 
46 Downing, C., D. Jaffee, et al. (2005). "Information Asymmetries in the Mortgage Backed Securities 
Market." University of California at Berkeley May. 
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seller’s product, sellers with high-quality goods would not have an incentive to enter the 
market. As high-quality sellers exit the market, the average market quality and price fall. 
This forces more sellers to exit the market. Eventually if enough sellers exit, the market 
will collapse.  
 The severity of the lemons problem will depend on how much private information 
buyers can gain about the seller’s product. Sellers’ behaviors can serve as a signal and 
provide buyers with valuable information about the quality of their product. Genesove 
(1993) explores how the market responds when buyers gain information about a seller’s 
type. The example provided is of a consumer in search of an apple. Only the seller of the 
apple knows the true quality of the product. Buyers only know that there are two types of 
sellers; farmers that love apples and farmers that hate apples.  A Farmer’s preference for 
apples can send valuable information to the buyer and save the market from its collapse. 
It is expected that a farmer that loves apples will retain the good apples for their own 
consumption, while the farmer who hates apples will take all their apples to the market. 
Incorporating this information into the market will provide a price premium for apples 
sold by farmers that hate apples. 
 Genesove test this hypothesis by examining used car auctions and finds some 
support. In the study, sellers of used cars are either new-car dealers or used-car dealers. 
New-car dealers are expected to sell all their used cars at the auction, while used-car 
dealers would retain the good-quality and sell the low-quality cars. Therefore it is ex-
pected that new-car dealers should receive a premium for their cars. In a similar study, 
Chezum and Wimmer (1997) explore price differentials in the thoroughbred yearlings 
market. In the thoroughbred industry two types of sellers exist. There are “breeders,” who 
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only breed horses to be sold, and “racers,” who both bread and race horses. The authors 
find evidence that “breeders” earn a premium for their yearlings relative to “racers”. It is 
expected that “racers” would only bring their low-quality horses to the market, and retain 
their good-quality horses.   
5.2.2 Asymmetric Information in the Mortgage Market 
 Glaeser et al (1997) provide a model that actually credits the presence of a liquid 
securities market to the existence of ex-ante information asymmetries in the securitization 
process. If the secondary market gains access to accurate information about the loans 
grouped into the Mortgage Backed Securities, they would only demand the high quality 
loans. Downing et al (2005) further explain that the government sponsored enterprises 
(GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, purposefully restrict information about the mort-
gages which back their securities. The GSEs insure loans which meet their guidelines and 
securitize them to increase liquidity for mortgages and facilitate mortgage origination. 
The GSE groups loans with common duration but allows all other quality measures to 
vary as long as they meet the minimum standards. Purchasers of the Mortgage Backed 
Securities do not have any information about the quality of the pool.  They just know the 
expected duration of the income stream. Investors in mortgage securities invest in the 
portfolio of loans and are concerned with the overall quality of the pool. The pooling of 
mortgage loans would suggest distribution of quality within the pool of securitized loans, 
and consequently, there must be an incentive for lenders to also sell high quality loans.  
 When examining the securitization decision for banks, a subset of mortgage lend-
ers, Ambrose et al (2005) contend that banks should securitize all loans. The securitiza-
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tion process would minimize exposure to credit risk and interest rate risk, would increase 
liquidity, and would reduce the required reserve requirements. Specifically, the authors 
propose that the capital requirements established by Basel capital rules47 create an incen-
tive for banks to sell low risk loans and retain high risk loans. This occurs because the 
Basel I capital requirements do not vary with the quality of mortgages, and thus the capi-
tal requirements would be too low for high risk loans. In an empirical test the authors find 
that securitized loans experience lower default rates compared to loans retained as part of 
the banks’ portfolios. They attribute their findings to two reasons: first, banks are res-
ponding to the incentives provided by Basel I; and second, they are responding to the 
reputation effect. The reputation effect exists due to the repeated interaction between sel-
lers (lenders) and buyers of loans (secondary market). The repeated interaction compels 
banks to supply the secondary market with loans which have lower probabilities of de-
fault and prepayment, therefore maintaining demand for the mortgages they supply. 
 Third party originators, like mortgage brokers, do not face the same incentive 
structure as banks. Third party originators are classified as middlemen between the lender 
and the consumer and are usually a good source of new business to the lender. Mortgage 
brokers often carry lower overhead cost, typically use incentive pay structure, and conse-
quently attract more productive loan officers (LaCour-Little and Chun 1999).  
 TPO operations are a large fraction of the overall mortgage market as indicated by 
their 52% share of all mortgages from 1997 to 2004. These operations employ 418,700 
                                                 
47 Basel accords are banking laws established by Basel Committee on Banking and Supervision (BCBS) at 
the Bank of International Settlements. In 2004, Basel II was recommended and it allowed capital require-
ments to adjust with the risk of each loan. Basel I had a fixed 50% capital requirement for all residential 
mortgages. http://www.cml.org.uk/cml/policy/issues/748  
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people at 53,000 companies.48 However, their presence further magnifies the principal-
agent problem so inherent in the securitization process. LaCour-Little et al (1999) and 
Alexander et al. (2002) provide evidence that loans originated through TPOs are more 
likely to prepay or default compared to loans originated through the lender. TPOs are 
compensated for originating loans but are not directly accountable for the loan perfor-
mance of the originated loans. Therefore, it is expected that TPOs would not be meticu-
lously screening borrowers for default.  
 Alexander et al. (2002) find that loans originated by TPOs are more likely to de-
fault after controlling for observable default characteristics. LaCour-Little et al. (1999) 
find that TPO loans are more likely to be refinanced and prepaid in comparison to retail 
loans. Mortgage brokers have an incentive to “churn” the consumer by refinancing the 
mortgage when market conditions are favorable because market interest rates are falling. 
The higher prepayment and default rates reduce the discounted value of the income 
stream and are therefore costly to investors. According to Alexander et al. (2002) and 
Spader et al. (2009), the recent market response has been to increase interest rates on 
TPO originated loans by as much as 50 basis points, or one-half of one percent. Another 
mechanism to control the principal-agent problem inherent with TPO loans is to impose 
pre-payment penalties on brokered loans. (LaCour-Little et al. 1999).  Brokers can either 
choose to incur the 50 basis point penalty or impose a prepayment penalty on consumer 
loans.  
 The 50 basis point penalty is implemented to reflect the higher risk of TPO loans 
relative to lender-originated loans. However, the penalty has reduced the competitiveness 
                                                 
48 National Mortgage Broker Association website http://www.namb.org/namb/Mission.asp?SnID=1585056730   
110 
 
  
 
of the TPOs in mortgage origination. The difference in prices between lender originated 
loans and third-party originators has created an incentive for brokers to vertically inte-
grate into lending operations. The new structure of the TPOs allows them to lend their 
own funds in addition to maintaining the option of serving as a middleman between other 
lenders and the consumer. The hybrid lender (or hybrid TPO) originates and lends its 
own funds; however, it does not service the loans or maintain any loans on portfolio. Fi-
nancial constraints force the hybrid lender to securitize the loans immediately after origi-
nation. Additionally, the firm maintains the option to act as a regular broker and originate 
loans for other lenders. Since these firms do not maintain any loans on portfolio and, un-
like banks, do not face Basel I capital requirements, any sorting behavior can be attri-
buted to asymmetric information. Ambrose et al. (2005) are unable to separate the capital 
requirement effect and the asymmetric information effect in their results. By examining 
the hybrid lender, I can attribute any sorting behavior directly to the presence of asymme-
tric information in the mortgage market. Furthermore, these firms are new in the mort-
gage industry and their behavior has not been examined. Alexander et al. (2002) postulate 
that the 50 basis point penalty was introduced during the period of their study, which 
ranged from 1996 to 1998. This would suggest the incentive for a TPO to vertically inte-
grate into lending occurred between 1996 and 1998.    
5.3 Hybrid Lender  
 During the origination of a loan, a hybrid lender has two options: it can choose to 
operate as a TPO or as a lender. As a TPO, the firm serves as a middleman between the 
consumer and downstream lender. In this method, the hybrid lender receives commission 
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from the consumer and may earn yield spread premium (YSP) from the lender. The firm 
does not experience any cost of default or repayment for loans originated as a TPO.   
 Alternatively, the hybrid lender can choose to act as a lender and incur the re-
sponsibility of underwriting and funding the loan. In this instance, the firm is responsible 
for insuring that the loan meets the secondary market’s requirements, and any default or 
repayment would become the responsibility of the firm. Upon funding, the hybrid lender 
sells the loan into the secondary market to be pooled into securities. The sale of the loan 
usually occurs within 90 days of funding (Ambrose, LaCour-Little et al. 2005).  
 During the sale of the loan to the secondary market, the hybrid lender can use ei-
ther the cash or swap program. The swap program requires the lender to provide a pool of 
loans, which are swapped for a Mortgage Backed Securities from either of the GSEs or 
from a private firm (to remain consistent with the literature, I will refer to the private 
firms in the securitization market as Private Label). The hybrid lender operations do not 
generate large enough volume to utilize the swap program. In addition, due to financial 
constraints, hybrid lenders typically need to sell their loans quickly and cannot wait to 
create a large pool of loans to sell. Therefore, hybrid lenders usually sell their loans 
through the cash program.  
 The cash program allows the firm to sell the rights to the loan to the GSE or pri-
vate label firm and receive the increased liquidity.49 The purchaser of the loan is respon-
sible for packaging the loans into multi-lender pools and securitizing them.  By liquidat-
                                                 
49 Government Sponsored Enterprises insure and purchase conventional or conforming loans. Loans that do 
not meet Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac guidelines are sold to Private Label firms. Private Label loans are 
not insured and consequently are packaged into riskier Mortgage Backed Securities.  
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ing its mortgages, the firm is able to finance future loans and continue its operations. 
Lending its own funds allows the hybrid lender to reduce its cost. As a lender, the firm 
bypasses the 50 basis point penalty imposed on TPO loans and thus can remain competi-
tive in the mortgage market. The cost to the firm for operating as a lender is that it bears 
the risk of prepayment or default. Since the firm has to continuously transact with agents 
in the secondary market, it must maintain a good reputation. If the firm continuously sells 
poor quality loans to the secondary market, the secondary market may impose conditions 
on future purchases. On the other hand, if the loan is brokered, then the downstream 
lender incurs all credit risk, interest risk, and reputation cost.  
5.4 Sorting Hypothesis. 
 The structure of the origination process suggests some loan qualities that may be 
used to sort loans and may affect pricing of a mortgage. If information asymmetry does 
affect the firm’s lend-broker decision, then the following relationships should be ob-
served.  
5.4.1 Termination Risk 
 It is expected that the firm will choose to lend loans with lower probabilities of 
termination. If the reputation effect holds, then the firm will attempt to originate loans 
with better observable qualities. To maintain demand for its loans in the future, the hybrid 
lender will insure that the loans it provides to the secondary market have a low probabili-
ty of default or prepayment based on observable information. The firm may sort by spe-
cifically selecting mortgages which have low risk or it may sort using prices as a mechan-
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ism. To attract good quality customers and obtain only low risk loans, the firm may in-
crease prices on high risk characteristics,therefore creating the incentive for loan officers 
to lend when risk is low and brokering when risk is high. If pricing is used as a sorting 
mechanism, then the firm’s pricing for non-brokered loans would be lower than the pric-
ing for brokered loans and when controlling for the lower cost of funds. 
5.4.2 Distance 
 The relationship between lender and borrower suffers from asymmetric informa-
tion itself. The lender does not know the true default or prepayment probabilities of the 
loan. As an approximation of termination risk, the lender uses known credit and consum-
er characteristics. In addition, the lender has to rely on a third party (appraiser) to provide 
information on the housing conditions in the consumer’s market. Therefore, it is expected 
that the degree of asymmetric information increases with distance from the location of 
the firm. Garmaise et al (2004) provide evidence that distance is a factor in real estate 
transactions, and serves as an indirect measure of the degree of asymmetric information.  
 The hypothesis is that the hybrid lender will be more likely to broker loans as the 
distance between the consumer and the firm increases.  As suggested by Heuson et al. 
(2001), banks are more familiar with their local economies, and the strategies they pursue 
will be based on a combination of their own information, local conditions, and statistical 
evidence. Thus, distance can be utilized as an indirect measure of asymmetric informa-
tion. 
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5.4.3 Market Interest rates and volatility  
 To reduce interest rate risk, it is expected that the firm will broker loans when the 
market interest rates are volatile. Furthermore, given the evidence provided by LaCour-
Little et al (1999) that mortgage brokers are likely to re-solicit consumers to refinance 
when market interest rates fall, I expect that brokering activity will increase as market 
interest rates increase. As a broker, the firm can solicit the consumer to refinance when 
the interest rates decrease without jeopardizing its reputation in the secondary market. 
The shift in demand is expected to adjust the prices in the broker and lender markets and 
should be accounted for.  
5.4.4 Liquidity 
 The firm’s objective may be to act as a lender with all loans, regardless of quali-
ties.  However, since the firm faces liquidity constraints, its ability to lend depends on 
whether previous loans have been sold to the secondary market. Therefore, the firm may 
choose to broker loans as it approaches its credit constraint.  
 A limitation of this study and a weakness of the empirical test is that I cannot test 
for this hypothesis.  However, liquidity constraints are expected to be negligible during 
the time of the study as investment in mortgage-backed securities and real estate was high 
during the housing boom. Therefore, the firm would have been able to liquidate mortgag-
es easily. 
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5.5 Data 
 Firm-level data are used to test for information asymmetries in the presence of a 
hybrid lender. The dataset contains loan level information for a hybrid lender based in 
Louisville, Kentucky. The sample of transactions includes 9,140 loans originated be-
tween July 2002 and August 2007. During the time period, many mortgage brokers ex-
panded their mortgage business to include both lending and brokering operations. Al-
though it is unclear how many firms simultaneously operate in the broker and lender 
markets,50 the firm in this study and five other local competitors expanded into mortgage 
lending between 2003 and 2006. 
 Initially the firm operated solely as a third party originator (broker), serving as a 
middleman between consumers and lenders. In September 2005, the firm expanded its 
operations so it could act as a lender on its own behalf. After the commencement of lend-
ing operations, the firm originated a total of 4,479 loans; 57% of these were originated as 
a broker. Therefore, for 4,479 transactions, the firm had a choice between acting as a 
lender or a third party originator. A summary of transactions by period is provided in Ta-
ble 5.1.  
 The firm’s decision to expand into lending operations may have been an attempt 
to (1) expand available loan programs to the consumer, (2) specialize in a subset of loan 
programs, (3) or to bypass the 50 basis point penalty. Table 5.2 compares the quality of 
loans originated during third party origination (pre-2005) and hybrid lending operations 
(post-2005). Comparing the quality of loans between the two periods does not indicate 
                                                 
50 http;//www.mortgageloan.com/mortgage-lenders. 
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any obvious difference between the samples. Prepayment and default variables such as 
loan amount, loan to value ratio, and consumer credit scores are similar across samples. 
The amount of commission the loan officers received during the hybrid lending opera-
tions was $1,837, almost identical to average commission of $1,834 received under the 
broker only system. Loans originated under the hybrid system paid a higher interest rate 
of 7.4%, compared to 6.5% for loans originated before lending operations began. Howev-
er, as Figure 5.1 reveals, the variation in interest rates is representative of the macroeco-
nomic environment and increasing interest rates between 2002 and 2007. There is no evi-
dence of moral hazard or adverse selection across the two periods. By expanding the type 
of operations, the firm originated the same type of loans. The firm’s decision to vertically 
integrate into lending operations seems to be an effort to increase its profitability by eli-
minating the 50 basis point penalty.  
  Summary statistics comparing the non-brokered and brokered loans during the 
hybrid lending operations are presented in Table 5.3. The hypothesis that the firm is more 
likely to lend higher quality loans and broker lower quality loans is not immediately evi-
dent in the data. The samples are similar in default and prepayment variables like loan to 
value ratio, and credit scores; consequently, they do not indicate any sorting behavior by 
quality. However, the absence of sorting does not negate the presence of information 
asymmetries. Default and prepayment variables are observable to all market participants, 
while the lemons problem (Akerlof 1970) occurs when the quality measures are observa-
ble to one party of the market but not the other.  The difficulty in testing for asymmetric 
information is the fact that by assumption the information is unobservable. 
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   The distance variable provides an indirect measure of information asymmetries. 
Distance between lender and consumer is known to the firm but not observable to the 
buyers of mortgages in the secondary market. However, the prediction that the firm 
would be less likely to lend as the distance between consumer and the firm increases is 
unsubstantiated. As a lender, the average distance between the consumer and firm is 437 
miles, while the distance for brokered loans is 397 miles.51 If information asymmetries 
increase with the distance between the consumer and firm, then it would be expected that 
the firm would sort loans by distance, choosing to lend loans that are closer to the home 
office. There is a slight difference between the samples with respect to the loan amounts. 
The mean loan amount for lending is $123,000; this is slightly lower than brokered loans, 
which averaged $142,000.    
5.6 Methodology 
 The central question of this research is whether there is a systematic difference 
between the loans the firm originated as a lender and the brokered loans. If there is a var-
iation in the type of loans originated, is it due to quality differences and/or profitability? 
If there is no systematic difference between the loans in the operations, this suggests that 
the firm is willing to act as a lender for all loans but resorts to brokering loans when it 
meets its capital constraint.  
 To test for the presence of asymmetric information and consequently adverse se-
lection, I use the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973). Using the 
Lending and Brokered loans as the groups of interest, the decomposition will divide the 
                                                 
51 As an alternative measure of indirect information, I use local vs. nonlocal classification. During Hybrid 
operation, 12% of loans originated were in the Louisville area. 
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difference in price into “explained” differences arising from variation in loan quality and 
“unexplained” differences that are unaccounted for by the observable information. The 
systematic presence of unexplained differences would suggest that there are unobserved 
determinants in mortgage pricing and would imply that asymmetric information creates 
sorting behavior.  Nevertheless, due to the 50 basis point broker penalty, it is expected 
that unobserved difference may exist between the groups and may be reflected in the 
price variation. Consequently, the magnitude of the unexplained variation would also be 
of importance.   
 The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition is applied most often in labor market and dis-
crimination studies. It is often utilized to identify explained and unexplained differences 
in the male-female wages. The explained portion of the wage gap occurs because of vari-
ations in productivity between the groups, while any unexplained difference may be con-
sidered a measure of discrimination. This approach can be applied in the mortgage mar-
ket by examining mortgage prices. Since the interest rate of a mortgage is the price of the 
underlying risk, any differences between prices can be attributed to differences associated 
with observable and unobservable risk. An efficient market should base pricing on ob-
servable information, which accounts for prepayment and default risk. It is expected that, 
if asymmetric information does not exist in the mortgage market, pricing would be solely 
based on observable information and any variations in pricing would be accounted for by 
explained differences only. 
 The method of the decomposition is to determine how much of the mean mort-
gage price differential is accounted for by the observable determinants of risk. Using the 
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model provided by Ambrose et al (2004; 2005), I estimate a linear price equation (equa-
tion 5.1) for the brokered loans and another for non-brokered loans by including observa-
ble risk and pricing determinants: 
ࡼ࢏ ൌ ࢼ૙ ൅ ࢼ૚ࢄ ൅ ࢼ૛࢓࢘࢑࢚ࢉ࢕࢔ࢊ࢏࢚࢏࢕࢔࢙  ൅ ࢼ૝࢒ࢇ࢝ ࢏࢔ࢊࢋ࢞  ൅ ࢿ         (5.1) 
The price ࡼ࢏ is defined as the annual percentage rate minus the 10 year treasury. The ma-
trix X includes loan and consumer characteristics which are used to measure the probabil-
ity of default and prepayment. It includes the loan amount, consumer’s credit score, a 
dummy variable indicating whether the loan meets GSE guidelines, and the loan-to-value 
ratio. To control for loan characteristics, I include a dummy variable indicating whether 
the loan is a fixed rate mortgage, a dummy variable for second lien loans, and a dummy 
variable for 10, 15, 20, 25 and 30 year mortgages. I follow Ambrose and Pennington-
Cross (2000) and include the law index to control for spatial variation in regulatory envi-
ronments.52 The estimation also controls for the macroeconomic environment by includ-
ing a measure of market credit risk premium, defined as the difference between the Aaa 
and Baa bond rates.  Additionally, I control for the slope of the yield curve by calculating 
the difference between the 10 year and the one year Treasury bond rates. The credit risk 
premium will capture the market’s preference for safe assets (Aaa) relative to riskier as-
sets (Baa). An increasing credit risk premium signifies an increase in demand for safe or 
high quality assets. A steeper slope of the yield curve represents a macroeconomic envi-
ronment that incentivizes investment in long term assets. 
 The difference in the mean outcome is given by:  
                                                 
52 The law index is included to capture any differences in pricing that arise due to state regulatory environ-
ments.   
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ࡰ ൌ ࡱሺࡼ࢈ሻ െ ࡱሺࡼ࢒ሻ              (5.2) 
Here, ܧሺ ௕ܲሻ denotes the expected price of brokered loans, and ܧሺ ௟ܲሻ is the expected price 
of the non-brokered loans. For simplicity, equation (5.1) can be written as:  
                                ࡼ࢏ ൌ ࢄ࢏ᇱ࡮࢏ ൅ ࣕ࢏,                     ࡱሺࣕ࢏ሻ ൌ ૙,       ࢏  א   ሼ࢈, ࢒ሽ                   (5.3) 
Then the difference in expected price can be rewritten as: 
                   ࡰ ൌ ࡱሺࡼ࢈ሻ െ ࡱሺࡼ࢒ሻ ൌ ࡱሺࢄ࢈ሻᇱ࡮࢈ െ ࡱሺࢄ࢒ሻᇱ࡮࢒       (5.4) 
By assumption ܧሺܤ௜ሻ ൌ ܤ௜ ܽ݊݀ ܧሺ߳௜ሻ ൌ 0. Rearranging equation 5.4, the difference in 
expected price can be divided into three parts and provides the “three-fold” decomposi-
tion.  
ࡰ ൌ ሾࡱሺࢄ࢈ሻ െ ࡱሺࢄ࢒ሻሿ′࡮࢈ ൅ ሾࡱሺࢄ࢈ሻሿ′ሺ࡮࢈ െ ࡮࢒ሻ ൅ ሾࡱሺࢄ࢈ሻ െ ࡱሺࢄ࢒ሻሿ′ሺ࡮࢈ െ ࡮࢒ሻ       (5.5) 
 ࡰ ൌ  ࡱ ൅ ࡯ ൅ ࡵ  
where ܧ ൌ ሾܧሺܺ௕ሻ െ ܧሺ ௟ܺሻሿ′ܤ௕  accounts for group difference in the quality of loans. 
The variation in pricing due to differences in coefficients is given by “C” and is equal to 
ሾܧሺܺ௕ሻሿ′ሺܤ௕ െ ܤ௟ሻ. Finally,” I” is the interaction of differences of attributes and coeffi-
cients between the broker and lender groups.  
 The explained component (E) is the expected change in the price of brokered 
loans, if brokered loans attributes were equal to the attributes of non-brokered loans. The 
“C” portion measures the change in the price of brokered loans, if brokered loans had the 
coefficients associated with non-brokered loans. The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition will 
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assist in identifying if there is a systematic difference in quality of loans between the 
groups. Additionally, if the unexplained portion of the difference, denoted by ‘C,’ is less 
than -50 basis point, it implies that non-brokered loans have positive unobserved quali-
ties, which leads to prices being lower in the lending operations. It is possible that unob-
served qualities exist if C is larger or equal to -50 basis points. This will occur if a portion 
ߙ א ሾ0,1ሻ of the lower marginal cost associated with lending are not passed on to the con-
sumer. In this instance, unobserved qualities may be present but will be unidentifiable.      
 The above decomposition can be rearranged to provide an explained and unex-
plained outcome (Jann 2008). The decomposition can be rewritten as the “two-fold” de-
composition if it is assumed that one group pays standard pricing and the other receives 
“preferential” pricing. That is, pricing adjustments only occur on one side of the market. 
If it assumed that the broker market has a standard pricing ߚכ ൌ ߚ௕ and non-brokered 
loans prices are adjusted, then the difference can be written as in equation (5.6). This as-
sumption is similar to the discrimination literature, which usually assumes that discrimi-
nation is directed towards one group only (Women). 
ࡰ ൌ ሾࡱሺࢄ࢈ሻ െ ࡱሺࢄ࢒ሻሿᇱࢼכ ൅ ሾࡱሺࢄ࢈ሻሿᇱሺ࡮࢈ െ ࢼכሻ ൅ ሾࡱሺࢄ࢈ሻ െ ࡱሺࢄ࢒ሻሿᇱሺࢼכ െ ࡮࢒ሻ       (5.6)  
ࡰ ൌ ࡽ൅ ࢁ 
In the two fold decomposition, the explained portion is denoted by Q which is equal 
to ሾܧሺܺ௕ሻ െ ܧሺ ௟ܺሻሿ′ߚכ. The unexplained difference in expected means is given by: 
                ࢁ ൌ ሾࡱሺࢄ࢈ሻሿ′ሺ࡮࢈ െ ࢼכሻ ൅ ሾࡱሺࢄ࢈ሻ െ ࡱሺࢄ࢒ሻሿ′ሺࢼכ െ ࡮࢒ሻ                  ( 5.7) 
122 
 
  
 
The “two fold” decomposition provides an estimate of the effect of unobserved qualities 
on the prices of mortgages. Similar to the “three fold” decomposition, if unobserved qual-
ities do exist, they will be captured by the coefficient on U. If the estimate exceeds 50 
basis points, it will imply that unobserved qualities do influence pricing and sorting by 
the firm. However, this interpretation assumes that all observed predictors are included in 
the estimation. 
5.7  Results 
 The results of the OLS estimation for brokered (column 1), non-brokered loans 
(column 2), and pooled (column 3) samples are reported in Table 5.4. The coefficients of 
the estimation are consistent with expectation and have signs similar to the findings in 
Ambrose (2004; 2005). In both the broker and lending specifications, the price of a mort-
gage increases as observable risk of a loan increases. Although the signs are as expected 
in both specifications, there is a variation in pricing of the risk characteristics across mar-
kets.  
 The pricing of each observable risk factor is most higher in the broker market rel-
ative to the lending market. In the broker market, loans meeting conforming guidelines 
are priced 51 basis points lower than non-conforming loans. The magnitude of the con-
forming status in the lending market is only 5 basis points and is statistically insignifi-
cant. For an increase of 10 units in consumer’s credit scores, broker and lending prices 
increase by 4 and 1 basis points, respectively. Mortgages used to fund the purchase of a 
new home are priced equally in both markets; they receive a price of 8 basis points less 
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than refinance loans. As the loan-to-value increases by one percentage point, lending 
prices increase by 2 basis points compared to 1 basis point in the broker market.  
 Prices in the broker market are responsive to changes in the macroeconomic envi-
ronment. For every unit increase in the difference between the 10 year treasury and one 
year treasure, mortgage prices increase by 27 basis points. However, an increase of one 
unit in the yield curve results in a decrease of 21 basis points in lending market, but the 
coefficient is insignificant. Prices in both the broker and lending markets are not respon-
sive to changes in credit risk. As market interest rate volatility increases, prices in the 
broker market increase by 91 basis points and by 133 basis points in the lending market. 
This indicates that both markets pass on the risk of interest rate movements to the con-
sumer.  
 The main coefficient of interest to test for the role of asymmetric information in 
mortgage pricing is the distance variable. For every additional mile of distance between 
the consumer and firm, the price of a mortgage increases by 5 basis points on average. 
For the broker market this represents an increases of 5.5 basis points, while price in the 
lending market increases by 4.2 basis points. Although there is evidence of pricing due to 
informational frictions, it was expected that the effect of distance on price would be more 
prominent in the lending market. The dummy variable for non-brokered loans in the 
pooled specification provides an estimate of the reduction of price lending consumers re-
ceive. On average, loans originated through the firm’s lending division receive a price 18 
basis points less than brokered loans.  
124 
 
  
 
 The variation in prices can arise due to either unobservable information or the 
lower marginal cost of lending. If the variation is due to lower marginal cost, then the 
firm is passing on 18 basis points to the consumer because it is bypassing the broker pe-
nalty. Alternatively, if it is assumed that none of the cost is transferred to the consumer, 
then the variation in price is due to unobservable qualities of the loan. If the unobservable 
qualities of a loan are high, then the firm can price a loan lower than the observable in-
formation would predict. Consequently, since non-brokered loans are priced 18 basis 
points lower than brokered loans and when assuming lower cost are not transferred to the 
consumer, then it must be that the unobserved qualities of non-brokered loans is higher.   
 To further test the source of variation in pricing between brokered and non-
brokered loans, I use Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. Table 5.5 reports the results from 
the “three-fold” Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition and the predicted expected price for each 
group. The mean expected price for brokered loans is 3.445% (annual percentage rate 
minus the 10 year treasury rate); this is compared to 3.410% for non-brokered loans. The 
difference between the mean expected prices across the groups is 0.035%. The difference 
is statistically insignificant at the 95% level.  
 The decomposition of the difference in expected prices yields a -0.22% coeffi-
cient attributed to the endowment effect. It is statistically significant and implies that the 
mean price of non-brokered loans would decrease by 22 basis points, if non-brokered 
loans had the loan qualities associated with the brokered loans. If the price of a mortgage 
reflects the underlying risk, then on average, the observable qualities of loans for which 
the firm chooses to act as a lender is lower than brokered loans. The result indicates the 
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presence of a systematic sorting behavior by the firm. Loans with higher qualities, based 
on observable information, are brokered, whereas loans with low observed quality are 
part of the lending portfolio. This result conflicts with the termination risk and reputation 
hypothesis, which predicts that the firm will lend when termination risk is low in order to 
develop a reputation in the secondary market. 
 The portion of the decomposed difference attributed to variations in coefficients 
accounts for 14 basis points and is statistically significant. If non-brokered loans were 
priced similar to the brokered loans, non-brokered loans would be priced 14 basis points 
higher. This implies that either the firm does not price observable risk as aggressively as 
does the broker market or unobservable information is used to determine the price of non-
brokered loans. Alternatively, we can assume that the firm is passing on the gains from 
lower marginal cost of lending to the consumer. The results do not indicate any explicit 
evidence that the firm charges lower prices in lending markets due to unobserved loan 
qualities. Therefore, the hypothesis that the firm brokers the “lemons” and retains the 
good quality loans is unsupported.  
 The interaction term in “three-fold” method absorbs some of the effect of the un-
explained differences. Consequently, as a robustness test, I use the two-fold decomposi-
tion and assume that the broker market has the standard mortgage pricing. In this specifi-
cation, the preferential pricing occurs towards one side of the market--the lending market. 
The results from the “two-fold” decomposition are given in Table 5.6. The difference in 
pricing and predicted prices remains unchanged, as would be expected. However, the ex-
plained portion of the decomposition now accounts for -.15%. Consequently, due to the 
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variations in loan qualities, non-brokered loans would be priced 15 basis points lower if 
they had the characteristics associated with the brokered loans. The unexplained varia-
tions account for 18 basis points of the difference.53 Therefore, brokered loans are priced 
18 basis points higher than non-brokered loans. This result is well within the 50 basis 
point difference expected due to the broker penalty, and adjusting the specification does 
not change the results.  
5.8 Conclusion 
 This chapter examines the presence of information asymmetries in the mortgage 
industry. Specifically, it asks if information available to a mortgage firm but unobserved 
by the secondary market will affect a firm’s decision to lend its own funds. Previous stu-
dies, like Ambrose (2005), have examined banks and found that sorting does exist in the 
mortgage market. Banks are more likely to retain loans in their own portfolio when loans 
have positive unobserved risk qualities. However, studies have not been able to disaggre-
gate the reputation effect and the capital requirement effect.  
 In this study, I examine a hybrid lender, which does not confront capital require-
ments.  The firm can either broker or lend its own funds when originating a mortgage. 
Since the reputation effect and asymmetric information exist in the lending market and 
not the broker market, I can test for sorting by observed quality. To test for variation in 
unobserved qualities of loans between market types, I use the Blinder-Oaxaca decompo-
sition. 
                                                 
53 To ensure that these results are not driven by income variations, which are unobserved in the data but 
observed by the firm and the secondary market, I estimate the model using the specification in Chapter 4. I 
reduce the sample to conforming loans to eliminate income as a determinant of price. The results are un-
changed.  
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 The results of the decomposition provide evidence of a variation in pricing be-
tween the broker and lending markets that is not explained by observable risk factors. 
Loans that are part of the firm’s lending business are priced lower than brokered loans. 
The firm is charging lower prices because of the higher unobserved qualities of the non-
brokered loans. However, these results are inconclusive because the effect cannot be dis-
aggregated from the effect due to the lower marginal cost of lending.   
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Table  5.1: Number of transactions by type 
Period Transactions Brokered Lending 
Entire Sample (2002-2007) 9,140 7,209 1,931 
TPO Period (2002-2005) 4,661 4,661 0 
Hybrid lender Period (2005-2007) 4,479 2,548 1931 
 
Table  5.2: Hybrid vs TPO Samples 
 Hybrid TPO 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev. 
Credit score 671.13 67.13 669.84 64.95 
Note rate 7.40 1.69 6.51 1.60 
Commission ($) 1387.86 1439.42 1383.27 1304.77 
Loan amount 
($1,000) 134.40 101.37 132.97 86.50 
Loan To Value 65.70 28.43 70.29 25.74 
Fixed 0.64 0.48 0.62 0.48 
Second 0.23 0.42 0.13 0.33 
Cashout 0.53 0.50 0.54 0.50 
Distance 413.00 321.33 370.86 337.66 
Loan term (months) 338.91 58.83 323.03 69.77 
Purchase 0.19 0.39 0.17 0.38 
Rate and term 0.25 0.43 0.27 0.44 
30 year mortgage 0.84 0.37 0.75 0.43 
Observations 4479  4661  
Table  5.3: Descriptive Statistics 
 Non-brokered Loans Brokered Loans 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Credit score 668.24 67.43 673.31 66.83 
Note rate 7.50 1.56 7.32 1.78 
Commission ($) 1363.92 1220.51 1406.00 1585.37 
Loan amount 
($1,000) 123.52 84.56 142.64 111.76 
Loan To Value 67.17 28.23 64.58 28.53 
Fixed 0.68 0.47 0.60 0.49 
Second 0.22 0.41 0.23 0.42 
Cash out 0.53 0.50 0.53 0.50 
Distance 437.59 312.34 394.36 326.80 
Loan term (months) 340.21 58.69 337.94 58.92 
Purchase 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.40 
Rate and term 0.25 0.43 0.25 0.43 
30 year Mortgage 0.84 0.36 0.83 0.37 
Observations 1931  2548  
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Table  5.4: OLS Price Regression by Origination Type 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Broker Price Equation Lender Price Equation Pooled Price Equation 
Conforming ‐0.51** ‐0.05 ‐0.36**
 (5.7)  (0.51)  (5.30) 
Credit score ‐0.005** ‐0.001** ‐0.0034**
 (9.24)  (3.33)  (9.79) 
Fixed ‐0.87**  ‐1.29**  ‐1.06** 
 (10.16)  (17.41)  (18.16) 
HELOC   ‐1.71**  ‐2.73**  ‐1.83** 
 (7.73)  (7.25)  (10.16) 
Loan Amount ‐0.003**  ‐0.005**  ‐0.004** 
 (8.63)  (12.91)  (14.15) 
Purchase ‐0.087  ‐0.08  ‐0.07 
 (0.96)  (0.97)  (1.08) 
Rate and Term ‐0.63**  ‐0.31**  ‐0.47** 
 (7.49)  (4.18)  (8.20) 
Term 10 ‐1.54**  ‐0.93*  ‐1.24** 
 (3.31)  (2.15)  (3.90) 
Term 15 ‐0.89*  ‐0.28  ‐0.62** 
 (2.39)  (1.06)  (2.66) 
Term 20 ‐1.01*  ‐0.55  ‐0.708** 
 (2.69)  (1.89)  (2.94) 
Term 25 ‐0.37  0.15  ‐0.28 
 (0.81)  (0.35)  (0.94) 
Term 30 ‐1.06**  ‐0.16  ‐0.65** 
 (3.09)  (0.68)  (3.04) 
Second Lien 1.84**  2.35**  2.13** 
 (10.21)  (14.9)  (17.23) 
Distance 0.06**  0.043*  0.058** 
 (2.92)  (2.5)  (4.41) 
Distance squared ‐0.001  ‐0.00126  ‐0.002* 
 (1.12)  (1.18)  (2.04) 
Law Index 0.02*  ‐0.00185  0.009* 
 (2.64)  (0.37)  (2.16) 
Loan To value 0.011**  0.025**  0.017** 
 (4.11)  (11.07)  (9.66) 
Yield Curve 0.27*  ‐0.21  0.09 
 (2.5)  (1.62)  (1.13) 
Credit Risk ‐0.18  0.85  0.20 
 (0.24) (1.3) (0.39)
Interest Rate Volatility .91*  1.33**  0.95** 
(2.57) (3.86) (3.85)
Constant 7.64** 3.07** 5.78**
 (8.67)  (4.11)  (9.75) 
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Table 5.4: Continued      
non-brokered loans ‐ ‐ ‐0.186**
     (3.49) 
observations 2539 1925 4464 
R-squared .33 .44 .36 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Table  5.5: Three Fold Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition 
Prediction  (Mean Expected price) Coefficient 
Broker 3.445** 
 (0.04) 
Lending 3.409** 
 (0.03) 
Difference (D) 0.035 
 0.06 
            Decomposition 
Endowments -0.23** 
 (0.056) 
Coefficients 0.14** 
 (0.057) 
Interaction 0.11** 
 (0.59) 
 
Table  5.6: Two Fold Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition 
Prediction  Coefficient 
Broker 3.445** 
 (85.54) 
Lending 3.409** 
 (89.70) 
Difference (D) 0.035 
 0.52 
            Decomposition 
Explained -0.15** 
 (3.44) 
Unexplained 0.185** 
 (3.77) 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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6. Conclusion 
 In this dissertation, I provide a detailed look at the mortgage industry and the role 
of informational frictions in determining the structure and performance of the mortgage 
market. In Chapter 2, I provide an analysis of the market structure of the mortgage indus-
try. The institutional details and the complex structure of the mortgage market are dis-
cussed. I find that the configuration of the mortgage market at its present state is vastly 
different than its historical structure due to the reduction of information costs. The inno-
vation of the internet and local area networks have reduced the cost of transmitting in-
formation and have increased the ability for firms to collaborate. As a result, the mort-
gage market has disintegrated into specialized firms, where each firm provides a single 
component and collaborates with the components of the supply chain to produce the final 
product. However, the vertical disintegration of the supply chain has introduced princip-
al-agent problems. Asymmetric information concerns are mainly present in the broker 
segment of the mortgage market. The incentives and objectives of the broker are incom-
patible with the overall objective of the secondary market. Consequently, I find that more 
complete contracts are needed to realign the broker and market objectives. 
 Chapter 3, “A Model of Electronic Commerce in the Presence of a Gatekeeper,” 
provides a theoretical explanation of the effect of the internet on market outcomes. Em-
pirical studies examining the effect of the internet have provided inconsistent results. 
Search models assume that the reduction in search frictions would lead to more competi-
tive markets. However, I argue that gatekeepers operating in online markets may create 
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an anticompetitive effect, in addition to reducing the consumers’ search cost. Therefore, 
the conduct of the gatekeeper can cause prices in online markets to be higher than in re-
tail markets and provide online firms with larger profits. When testing for the effect of 
the internet on market outcomes, it is important to consider the conduct of the gatekeeper 
in the market and test for both prices and profits. 
 In Chapter 4, “Joint Determination of Consumer Search Behavior and Mortgage 
Pricing,” I examine the role of the Internet and Internet Comparison Search sites in re-
ducing consumer search costs and their effects on the prices consumers pay for mortgag-
es. Additionally, given the results from the third chapter, I expand the study to test for 
firm profits. Using a unique data set, I examine a mortgage firm’s pricing strategies in 
online and retail markets, and find evidence of market power in online markets that does 
not exist in retail markets. To control for consumers’ selection into market type, I use a 
switching regression and find that selection into online commerce is random and thus the 
estimation method is reduced to a pooled OLS. I find that online and retail consumers pay 
the same price on average for a mortgage. After controlling for variation in marginal cost, 
I find that the firm earns higher profits in online markets relative to the retail market. In 
addition to reducing the cost of search to the consumer, the availability of information in 
online markets allows firms to observe their competitors’ pricing, and therefore reduces 
the firms’ cost of monitoring. Both consumers and firms benefit from the availability of 
information, and consequently the presumed benefits to the consumer from the reduction 
of search costs are offset by the anticompetitive environment created by Internet Compar-
ison Search sites in online markets. For some mortgage types, the anticompetitive effect 
dominates the search cost effect, which leads to higher prices in online markets.  
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 In the final chapter, I analyze a mortgage firm’s portfolio choice to test for the 
lemons problem in the mortgage market. Using the unique data set from the third chapter, 
I investigate the loan characteristics that affect the firm’s decision to retain mortgages as 
part of its own portfolio. Mortgage lenders can use their own funds to finance a mortgage 
or alternatively can broker the loan using other lenders’ financing. I estimate the quality 
differences between lender originated loans and brokered loans using an Oaxaca decom-
position. I am able to decompose differences in prices between the broker and lender 
market into portions explained by the observed data and unexplained pricing which I 
attribute to asymmetric information. Since the Interest rate of a mortgage is the price of 
its underlying risk, then any variation in price is due to risk characteristics.  
 I find that non-brokered loans are on average priced 3 basis points lower than 
brokered loans. However the difference is statistically insignificant. By decomposing the 
difference, it is possible to disaggregate the difference in pricing into differences due to 
observable risk characteristics and difference due to unobserved characteristics. Non-
brokered loans are priced on average 18 points lower than brokered loans because of un-
observed qualities. Consequently, it is possible to assume that the lower unexplained 
price for non-brokered loans is in response to better unobserved characteristics of lender 
originated loans.  Although this supports the presence of asymmetric information in the 
mortgage market, the unobserved difference cannot be attributed to asymmetric informa-
tion with certainty. It is possible that the difference arises because of the lower cost of 
funds when the firm operates as a lender. Therefore, the lower prices in the lending mar-
ket may be due to the firm passing on the reduction in cost to the consumer.  
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